Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/747 of 17 December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to the criteria relating to the calculation of ex ante contributions, and on the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions may be partially or entirely deferred (Text with EEA relevance. )
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/747 of 17 December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to the criteria relating to the calculation of ex ante contributions, and on the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions may be partially or entirely deferred (Text with EEA relevance. )
Data as of 2026-07-04 · Compiled from an official source version. Later amendments or repeals may not be reflected; the official text prevails. · Read the official text ↗
This Regulation lays down rules specifying:
(1)
the criteria for the spreading out in time of the contributions to the Fund pursuant to Article 69(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014;
(2)
the criteria for determining the number of years by which the initial period referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation No (EU) 806/2014 can be extended in accordance with Article 69(3) of Regulation No (EU) 806/2014;
(3)
the criteria for establishing the annual contributions provided for in Article 69(4) of Regulation No (EU) 806/2014;
(4)
the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions may be partially or entirely deferred pursuant to Article 71(2) of Regulation No (EU) 806/2014.
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definition shall also apply:
(1)
‘initial period’ means the period referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014;
(2)
‘deferral period’ means a period of up to six months.
CHAPTER II — CRITERIA RELATING TO EX ANTE CONTRIBUTIONS
Criteria for spreading out in time ex ante contributions during the initial period
1. When assessing the phase of the business cycle and the impact that pro-cyclical contributions may have on the financial position of contributing institutions in accordance with Article 69(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the Board shall take into consideration at least the following indicators:
(a)
the macroeconomic indicators set out in the Annex, to identify the phase of the business cycle;
(b)
the indicators set out in the Annex, to identify the financial position of the contributing institutions.
2. The indicators taken into consideration by the Board shall be determined in respect of all participating Member States jointly.
3. Any decision by the Board to spread contributions out in time shall be applied equally to all institutions contributing to the Fund.
4. In any given contribution period, the level of annual contributions may be relatively lower than the average of the annual contributions calculated in accordance with Articles 69(1) and 70(2) of Regulation EU No 806/2014 only where the Board verifies that based on conservative projections the target level can be reached at the end of the initial period.
Criteria for determining the number of years by which the initial period can be extended
1. When determining the number of years by which the initial period referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 can be extended in accordance with Article 69(3) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the Board shall take into consideration at least the following criteria:
(a)
the minimum of the number of years required to reach the target level referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation EU No 806/2014 subject to annual contributions not exceeding two times the average annual contributions over the initial period);
(b)
the phase of the business cycle and the impact that pro-cyclical contributions may have on the financial position of contributing institutions, as specified by the indicators referred to in Article 3(1);
(c)
any additional disbursements of the Fund expected by the Board, after consultation with the ESRB, in the subsequent four-year period.
2. The Board shall not, under any circumstances, extend the initial period for more than four years.
Criteria for establishing the annual contributions after the initial period
When calculating the contributions referred to in Article 69(4) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, the Board shall take into account the phase of the business cycle and the impact that pro-cyclical contributions may have on the financial position of contributing institutions, as specified by the indicators referred to in Article 3(1).
1. The Board shall, on its own initiative after consulting the national resolution authority, or upon proposal by a national resolution authority, defer, in whole or in part, an institution's payment of extraordinary ex post contributions in accordance with Article 71(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, if it is necessary to protect its financial position.
2. The deferral of extraordinary ex post contributions may be granted by the Board upon an institution's request. That institution shall provide any information deemed necessary by the Board to conduct the assessment of the impact of the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions on its financial position. The Board shall take into account all information available to the national competent authorities to establish whether that institution meets the conditions for deferral referred to in paragraph 4.
3. When determining whether that institution meets the conditions for deferral, the Board shall assess the impact a payment of extraordinary ex post contributions would have on the solvency and liquidity position of that institution. Where that institution is part of a group, the assessment shall also include the impact of solvency and liquidity of the group as a whole.
4. The Board may defer payment of extraordinary ex post contributions where it concludes that the payment results in any of the following:
(a)
a likely breach, within the following six months, of the institution's minimum own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 3 ) ;
(b)
a likely breach, within the following six months, of the institution's minimum liquidity coverage requirement set out in Article 412(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and specified in Article 4 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 ( 4 ) ;
(c)
a likely breach, within the following six months, of the institution's specific liquidity requirement set out in Article 105 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) .
5. The Board shall limit the deferral period to the extent it is necessary to avoid risks to the financial position of that institution or its group. The Board shall regularly monitor whether the conditions for the deferral referred to in paragraph 4 continue to apply during the deferral period.
6. Upon request of that institution, the Board may renew the deferral period, where it determines that the conditions for the deferral referred to in paragraph 4 continue to apply. This renewal shall not exceed 6 months.
Assessment of the impact of the deferral on solvency
1. The Board, or the national resolution authority, shall assess the impact of the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions on the institution's regulatory capital position. That assessment shall include an analysis of the impact the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions would have on the institution's compliance with the minimum own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2. For the purpose of this assessment, the amount of ex post contributions shall be deducted from the institution's own funds position.
3. The analysis referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover at least the period up to the next reporting remittance date for the own funds requirement set out in Article 3 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 ( 6 ) .
1. The Board, or the national resolution authority, shall assess the impact of the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions on the institution's liquidity position. That assessment shall include an analysis of the impact a payment of extraordinary ex post contributions would have on the institution's ability to meet the liquidity coverage requirement provided for in Article 412(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and specified in Article 4 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61.
2. For the purposes of the analysis described in paragraph 1, the Board shall add a liquidity outflow, equal to 100 % of the amount payable at the point in time when the payment of extraordinary ex post contributions is due, to the calculation of net liquidity outflows as set out in Article 20(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61.
3. The Board shall also assess the impact of such outflow established under paragraph 2 on the specific liquidity requirements set out in Article 105 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
4. The analysis referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover at least the period up to the next reporting remittance date for the liquidity coverage requirement set out in Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014.
ANNEX
Macroeconomic indicators to identify the phase of the business cycle
GDP Growth Forecast and Economic Sentiment Indicator from the European Commission.
GDP Growth from ECB's Macroeconomic Projections for the euro area.
Indicators to identify the financial position of the contributing institutions
(1)
Private sector credit flow over GDP and Change in Total Financial Sector Liabilities from the European Commission's Scoreboard on Macroeconomic Imbalances.
(2)
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress and probability of a simultaneous default by two or more large and complex banking groups of the participating Member States from the ESRB's Risk Dashboard.
(3)
Changes in credit standards for loans to households (for house purchase) and changes in credit standards for loans to non-financial corporations from the ESRB's Risk Dashboard.
(4)
Indicators on the profitability of large banking groups of the participating Member States contained in the European Banking Authority Risk Dashboard, such as return on equity and net interest income to total operating income.
(5)
Indicators on the solvency of large banking groups of the participating Member States contained in the European Banking Authority Risk Dashboard, such as Tier 1 capital to total assets excluding intangible assets and impaired loans and past-due loans to total loans.
