Article 1
Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/477 is corrected as follows: (1) recital 28 is replaced by the following: ‘(28) The applicants claim that those offshore wind parks should be regarded as belonging to the general generation and wholesale market, given that the subsidies received cover no more than the net extra costs of the projects. However, the Commission has, in the decisions referred to in recital 20, repeatedly taken the view that installations receiving fixed subsidies were not part of the overall electricity generation and wholesale market. For the Commission, such subsidies shield beneficiaries from competition by providing guaranteed levels of revenue. The Commission sees no reason to depart from that approach.’; (2) recital 40 is replaced by the following: ‘(40) In line with its previous decisions referred to in recital 20, the Commission finds in the present case that fixed and legally defined subsidies for renewable electricity generation do not ensure that the facilities benefitting from such subsidies are directly exposed to competition.’; (3) recital 57 to 70 are replaced by the following: ‘(57) Engie has a long-standing presence in the Belgian electricity generation and wholesale market and remains the market leader. It does not operate on the public procurement platforms because it is in the applicants’ view not subject to the Directive ( 22 ) . Engie exerts a strong competitive pressure on contracting entities in Belgium. (58) Luminus is the second largest market player: it has a diversified generation portfolio that includes production from nuclear power plants located in Belgium ( 23 ) , which gives it access to a stable and (thanks to its low marginal cost) competitive flexible baseload electricity generation source. Luminus also operates hydro and gas-fired power plants in Belgium which provide flexible peak electricity generation. The market share of Luminus remains relatively low. In 2019, its market share was 13,7 % and in 2023 it was 14,1 % ( 24 ) . Based on the applicants’ forecasts, Luminus is expected to remain the second largest market player until at least 2034 ( 25 ) . Besides Engie, Luminus faces competition from other producers (namely RWE, Eneco and Total Energy) which are not considered to be contracting entities and which together accounted for over 62 % of the electricity generation and wholesale market in Belgium in 2023. It follows that the activities of Luminus are directly exposed to competition on the electricity generation and wholesale market in Belgium. (59) The HHI index, referred to in recital 46, is an indication, in relation with market shares, that competitors are taking a long time to challenge established players. Market concentration is, nevertheless, expected to drop further due to the planned closure of nuclear reactors in Belgium. (60) As regards the other contracting entities, Norther only operates one wind farm at present. Electricity generation from wind is not flexible and is dependent on weather conditions. Ørsted is not yet present on the Belgian electricity generation and wholesale market. Even in the next 10 years, those two companies are not expected to become major players in Belgium ( 26 ) . Both of them face competition from major players. It follows that the activities of Norther, of the other subsidiaries of Nethys and of Ørsted are directly exposed to competition on the electricity generation and wholesale market in Belgium. ( 22 ) Para. 164 of the request." ( 23 ) Luminus also enjoys drawing rights on some French nuclear power plants. Luminus’ controlling shareholder (EDF) operates a fleet of 56 nuclear reactors in France. French nuclear electricity production can be imported in Belgium via the interconnections between the two countries." ( 24 ) See Table 8 of Annex II to the request." ( 25 ) Ibid ." ( 26 ) Ibid .’;" (4) recitals 71 to 76 are replaced by the following: ‘4. CONCLUSION (61) Since the conditions set out for an exemption in Article 34 of Directive 2014/25/EU are not met, Directive 2014/25/EU should continue to apply to contracts intended to enable the pursuit of renewable electricity generation receiving fixed and legally defined premiums in Belgium. (62) In view of the factors examined in recitals 40 to 60, the condition of direct exposure to competition laid down in Article 34(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU should be considered to be met in Belgium in respect of the activities related to the overall electricity generation and wholesale market in Belgium. (63) Directive 2014/25/EU should therefore not apply where contracting entities award contracts intended to enable those activities, or where design contests as defined in Article 2, point (17), of Directive 2014/25/EU are organised for the pursuit of such activities in that geographic area. (64) This Decision is without prejudice to the application of the Union rules on competition and of the provisions in other fields of Union law. In particular, the criteria and the methodology used to assess direct exposure to competition under Article 34 of Directive 2014/25/EU are not necessarily identical to those used to perform an assessment under Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty or Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 ( 27 ) , as confirmed by the General Court of the European Union ( 28 ) , ( 27 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) ( OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj )." ( 28 ) Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2016, Österreichische Post AG v Commission , T-463/14, ECLI:EU:T:2016:243, paragraph 28. See also Directive 2014/25/EU, recital 44.’;" (5) Article 2 is replaced by the following: ‘Article 2 Without prejudice to Article 1, Directive 2014/25/EU shall not apply to the awarding of contracts intended to enable the electricity generation and wholesale activities to be carried out in Belgium, with the exception of electricity generation and wholesale activities from Doel 4 and Tihange 3, which fall outside the scope of this Decision.’ .