Article 2
The aid referred to in Article 1 is authorized subject to France meeting the following conditions and commitments: (a) it must ensure that all the recovery measures and all the arrangements provided for under the scheme described in Article 1 are implemented; (b) it must not amend the conditions laid down in the recovery plan, except with the Commission's prior agreement. At all events, the "better fortunes" clause may be transferred no earlier than at the time of the privatization of Crédit Lyonnais, and only at the market price; that price will be verified by independent assessments; (c) it must ensure, given the size of the estimated overall cost of the scheme to the State of FRF 45 billion, that the commercial capacity of Crédit Lyonnais is reduced by means of a cut of at least 35 % in its commercial operations abroad, including its European banking network, by the end of 1998 in accordance with the commitments given by France in its letter of 18 July 1995. If that objective cannot be achieved by the deadline set without causing substantial losses that require the shareholder in question to provide further financial assistance in order in particular to ensure compliance with the Community solvency ratio, the Commission undertakes to examine the possibility of extending that deadline. If the costs of the scheme, estimated at FRF 45 billion, are exceeded, it will be necessary to re-examine the scale of the reduction in the commercial operations of Crédit Lyonnais as accepted by the abovementioned letter; (d) it must prevent Crédit Lyonnais from benefiting from a carry-over of tax losses in respect of the 1994 tax loss covered by the capital increase of FRF 4,9 billion; (e) it must prevent Crédit Lyonnais from repurchasing hived-off industrial and commercial assets, except at the price at which the assets were transferred to CDR or at the market price if that is higher than the price at which the assets were transferred to CDR, and at all events subject to an overall limit of FRF 5 billion; (f) it must prevent Crédit Lyonnais from sharing in any of the proceeds of sales from CDR; (g) it must achieve a separation between CDR and Crédit Lyonnais as regards their managers, their administration and the system of monitoring and supervising the management of the hived-off assets; (h) it must ensure that the committees responsible for managing the hived-off assets are independent of Crédit Lyonnais; (i) it must eliminate any possibility of a carry-over of residual tax losses for years prior to 1995 for Crédit Lyonnais if, at the time of privatization, the "better fortunes" clause is transferred; (j) it must ensure that Crédit Lyonnais uses the proceeds of sales to restructure non-performing assets and activities; (k) it must ensure that Crédit Lyonnais pays to SPBI the levy sums in accordance with the "better fortunes" clause; (l) it must pay to SPBI the proceeds of privatizing Crédit Lyonnais, particularly those deriving from the sale of the shares currently held by SPBI, and ask Parliament to endorse payment to SPBI of the proceeds of privatizing the remaining shares.