Article 1
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/969 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities
Data as of 2026-07-04 · Compiled from an official source version. Later amendments or repeals may not be reflected; the official text prevails. · Read the official text ↗
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .
ANNEX In the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’, the following entry is replaced: Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘14. Anatolii PRIZENKO Businessman DOB: 26.11.1974 POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova) Nationality: Moldovan Gender: male Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns. Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society. Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 16.12.2024’
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