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Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/886 of 12 May 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/886 of 12 May 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/886 · Regulation · 3 articles

Data as of 2026-07-04 · Compiled from an official source version. Later amendments or repeals may not be reflected; the official text prevails. · Read the official text ↗

Article 1

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Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/796 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

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This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Supplementary provisions

ANNEXSupplementary provisions

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ANNEX In Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/796, under the heading ‘A. Natural Persons’, entries 3 to 8 are replaced by the following:   Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘3. Alexey Valeryevich MININ Алексей Валерьевич МИНИН Date of birth: 27.5.1972 Place of birth: Perm Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Passport number: 120017582 Issued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Validity: from 17.4.2017 until 17.4.2022 Location: Moscow, Russian Federation Nationality: Russian Gender: male Alexey Minin took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands and in cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States. As a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Alexey Minin was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW. A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania (United States of America) has indicted Alexey Minin, as an officer of the GRU, for computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyber-attacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Alexey Minin is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 30.7.2020 4. Aleksei Sergeyvich MORENETS Алексей Сергеевич МОРЕНЕЦ Date of birth: 31.7.1977 Place of birth: Murmanskaya Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Passport number: 100135556 Issued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Validity: from 17.4.2017 until 17.4.2022 Location: Moscow, Russian Federation Nationality: Russian Gender: male Aleksei Morenets took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands and in cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States. As a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Aleksei Morenets was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW. A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania (United States of America) has indicted Aleksei Morenets, as assigned to Military Unit 26165, for computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyber-attacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Aleksei Morenets is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 30.7.2020 5. Evgenii Mikhaylovich SEREBRIAKOV Евгений Михайлович СЕРЕБРЯКОВ Date of birth: 26.7.1981 Place of birth: Kursk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Passport number: 100135555 Issued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Validity: from 17.4.2017 until 17.4.2022 Location: Moscow, Russian Federation Nationality: Russian Gender: male Evgenii Serebriakov took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands and in cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States. As a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Evgenii Serebriakov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW. Since spring 2022, Evgenii Serebriakov is leading “Sandworm” (a.k.a. “Sandworm Team”, “BlackEnergy Group”, “Voodoo Bear”, “Quedagh”, “Olympic Destroyer” and “Telebots”), an actor and hacking group affiliated with Unit 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate. Sandworm has carried out cyber-attacks on Ukraine, including Ukrainian government agencies, following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyber-attacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Evgenii Serebriakov is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 30.7.2020 6. Oleg Mikhaylovich SOTNIKOV Олег Михайлович СОТНИКОВ Date of birth: 24.8.1972 Place of birth: Ulyanovsk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Passport number: 120018866 Issued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Validity: from 17.4.2017 until 17.4.2022 Location: Moscow, Russian Federation Nationality: Russian Gender: male Oleg Sotnikov took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands and in cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States. As a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Oleg Sotnikov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW. A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania (United States of America) has indicted Oleg Sotnikov, as an officer of the GRU, for computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyber-attacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Oleg Sotnikov is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 30.7.2020 7. Dmitry Sergeyevich BADIN Дмитрий Сергеевич БАДИН Date of birth: 15.11.1990 Place of birth: Kursk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Dmitry Badin took part in a cyber-attack with a significant effect against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) and in cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States. As a military intelligence officer of the 85th Main Centre for Special Services (GTsSS) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Dmitry Badin was part of a team of Russian military intelligence officers who conducted a cyber-attack against the German federal parliament in April and May 2015. That cyber-attack targeted the parliament’s information system and affected its operation for several days. A significant amount of data was stolen and the email accounts of several MPs, as well as of former Chancellor Angela Merkel, were affected. A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania (United States of America) has indicted Dmitry Badin, as assigned to Military Unit 26165, for computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyber-attacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Dmitry Badin is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 22.10.2020 8. Igor Olegovich KOSTYUKOV Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ Date of birth: 21.2.1961 Nationality: Russian Gender: male Igor Kostyukov is the current Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), where he previously served as First Deputy Head. One of the units under his command is the 85th Main Centre for Special Services (GTsSS) (a.k.a. “Military Unit 26165”, “APT28”, “Fancy Bear”, “Sofacy Group”, “Pawn Storm” and “Strontium”). In this capacity, Igor Kostyukov is responsible for cyber-attacks carried out by the GTsSS, including those with a significant effect constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States. In particular, military intelligence officers of the GTsSS took part in the cyber-attack against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) in April and May 2015 and the attempted cyber-attack aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands in April 2018. The cyber-attack against the German federal parliament targeted the parliament’s information system and affected its operation for several days. A significant amount of data was stolen and email accounts of several MPs, as well as of former Chancellor Angela Merkel, were affected. The GRU remains active in carrying out cyberattacks against the Union or its Member States. As a member of the GRU, Igor Kostyukov is therefore involved in cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 22.10.2020’

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Source: EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the EU), © European Union, reuse permitted under Commission Decision 2011/833/EU.

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