92/261/EEC: Commission Decision of 18 March 1992 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/32.290 - Newitt/Dunlop Slazenger International and Others) (Only the English and Dutch texts are authentic)

• Articles: 7

Article 1

Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd has infringed Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty by applying in its business relations with its customers a general ban on exporting its products, designed to protect its exclusive distribution network, and by implementing, in respect of some of its products (tennis-balls, squash-balls, tennis-rackets and golfing equipment), various measures - refusal to supply, dissuasive pricing measures, marking and follow-up of exported products, buy-back of exported products and the discriminatory use of official labels - in order to ensure enforcement of the export ban.

All Weather Sports International BV has infringed Article 85 (1) by urging and participating in the implementation of such measures in the Netherlands in respect of Dunlop products.

Pinguin Sports BV has infringed Article 85 (1) by urging the implementation of similar measures in the Netherlands in respect of Slazenger products.

Article 2

A fine of ECU 5 000 000 is hereby imposed on Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd and a fine of ECU 150 000 on All Weather Sports Benelux BV (which has taken over the assets of All Weather Sports BV) in respect of the infringements referred to in Article 1.

The fine shall be paid, in ecus, to the Commission of the European Communities, account No 310-0933000-43, Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Agence Européenne, Rond Point Schuman 5, 1040 Brussels, within a period of three months of the notification of this Decision. After the expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable at the rate charged by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund on its ecu operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision is adopted, plus three and a half percentage points.

Article 3

Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd shall, in so far as it has not already done soe, terminate the infringements referred to in Article 1 of this Decision. It shall refrain from adopting any measure having equivalent effect.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to:

Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd,

Challenge Court,

Barnett Wood Lane,

Leatherhead,

UK - Surrey KT22 2LW,

BTR plc,

Vincent Square,

UK - London SW1P 2PL,

All Weather Sports Benelux BV,

Postbus 295,

Wattstraat 20,

NL-2700 AG-Zoetemeer,

Pinguin Sports BV,

Postbus 30,

Industrieweg 50,

NL-2380 AA Zoeterwoude/Rijndijk.

This Decision shall be enforceable pursuant to Article 192 of the EEC Treaty. Done at Brussels, 18 March 1992. For the Commission

Leon BRITTAN

Vice-President

(1) OJ No 13, 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62. (2) OJ No 127, 20. 8. 1963, p. 2268/63. (3) These figures apply only to what are known as 'first-grade tennis-balls', i.e. top quality balls used in matches and competitions, though these are also the ones most commonly used in general. (4) Controlled by the Japanese Sumitomo group. (5) See recital 34 below and Annex 2. (6) See recital 3 above. (7) Letter dated 15 October 1986 to Newitt. (8) See recital 33 below. (9) Letter dated 3 September 1987 from BTR to Newitt's solicitors. (10) Telex sent on 1 February 1989 by Dunlop USA to Newitt. (11) See recital 12 above. (12) See recitals 34 and 35 below. (13) See in particular the telex sent on 10 March 1986 by DSI to AWS. (14) KNLTB: Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennis Bond. (15) Letters sent on 29 May 1990 by the Commission to DSI, BTR, AWS and Pinguin. However, it should be noted that the Commission's interpretation, in the Statement of Objections, of a number of documents obtained during the investigation at AWS has been challenged by AWS. The Commission's interpretation is not maintained here in respect of the following: Statement of Objections point 37 in fine (not 'various', but 'one' document), point 53 in fine ('eigen kenmerken'), point 64 first paragraph in fine ('inkoop' and 'verkoopprijzen'), point 72 in fine ('artificial exchange rates') and point 74. (16) See recitals 16 to 18 above. (17) See recitals 18 above. (18) See recitals 19 above. (19) See in particular the telefax sent on 16 November 1987 by AWS to DSI and the telefax sent on 17 November 1987 by DSI to AWS. See also recital 21 above. (20) See recitals 22 et seq. above. (21) AWS internal memorandum dated 4 March 1987. (22) Sometimes referred to as 'special net prices' by AWS. (23) For the significance of this measure, see recital 18 above. (24) Meeting of the NSF (Dutch sports federation) on 20 October 1986. (25) See in particular the record of the meeting of Dunlop racket sports goods distributors on 6 and 7 May 1987, record of the meeting between DSI and AWS on 15 and 16 May 1986 and AWS's internal memorandum of 7 November 1986. (26) Meeting on 15 and 16 May 1986. (27) The warning was expressed in the following terms: 'You will not be unaware of the importance the Commission attaches to compliance with the Treaty's competition rules and more particularly those concerning the free movement of goods within the Community. The Commission has always taken the view that any barrier to exports must be considered a particularly serious infringement of those rules. If, therefore, as the complainant maintains - and the documents supporting his complaint seem at first sight to confirm the validity of this claim - you have exerted pressure on him of any kind whatsoever with a view to restricting his freedom to export within the common market, I call upon you to cease doing so immediately.' (28) 'It is just possible that the Commission may contact you as one of our European distributors. If so, please do not make any response without first contacting myself. This is most important. We obviously wish to assist the Commission with their investigations, but to do so in a coordinated way' (letter dated 12 August from the Managing Director). (29) See recital 21 above. (30) See recital 10 above. (31) This was actually implemented by DSI in collaboration with AWS in the Netherlands: see recitals 34 and 35 above. See also recital 56 below on the reasons adduced by DSI to justify these protection measures. (32) Indeed, the very existence of two price-lists, one for all export countries, the other for the United Kingdom only, is questionable in terms of its economic justification or, in any event, in terms of the frequently large disparities between the two sets of prices, which are usually to the disadvantage of the UK. The fact that domestic prices are for the most part considerably higher (15 to 50 %) (see recital 12 above) removes, in many cases, any incentive for UK firms to export. DSI has announced that it intends to do away with this double price list within the Community. The Commission reserves the right - if this intention is not put into effect - to return to this question and examine its compatibility with Article 85 (1) (possible existence of indirect export barriers) and, for products where DSI proves to hold a dominant position, with Article 86 (possible discriminatory pricing practices). (33) Administrative and sales staff, advertising and promotion, storage costs, distribution costs, travel and entertainment expenses, postage, telex, fax, bad debts. (34) DSI acknowledges this, moreover, indirectly in its written reply to the Statement of Objections - and shows that it persists in this view - when, expressing regret at the export bans imposed on Newitt and the interruptions in supply, it adds that 'this matter should have been dealt with entirely through the mechanism of price and discount adjustment' (see recital 53 above). (35) The consumer certainly cannot imagine that the selection of the 'official' balls is carried out solely on a financial basis and not on the basis of their technical properties (see recital 29), particularly when the 'official' sticker is followed by the legend 'the only approved and recommended tennis-ball', - referring to approval and recommendation by the KNLTB. It is significant in this respect that AWS urged DSI to take back its old stocks of balls not marked with this label. (36) See in particular Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299. See also Article 3 (d) of Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 (OJ No L 173, 30. 6. 1983, p. 1). (37) See recitals 6 to 9 above. (38) See recital 46 above. (39) See recital 43 above. (40) In this context, BTR communicated to the Commission by letter dated 12 December 1990 a 'competition law compliance manual' and, by letter dated 22 January 1991, a new standard distribution agreement. (41) See in particular 53 above. (42) However, the Commission acknowledges that this export ban was not always applied.

Article 85

(1) prohibits such agreements and such concerted practices, which had the direct object and effect of restricting competition and of affecting trade between Member States and which prevented Dutch consumers from benefiting from lower prices than those charged by DSI's exclusive distributor.

(52) A document obtained at the premises of Pinguin shows that it too urged DSI to stop supplying Newitt unless an 'arrangement' was possible. The wording of the text is such that it must be concluded that the 'arrangement' would in one way or another restrict Newitt's freedom to export and that here too there was a concerted practice in breach of Article 85 (1).

(53) In its written and oral replies to the Statement of Objections, DSI, while denying that it imposed a permanent export ban, acknowledges that 'on occasion' it took such measures in respect of countries where it had exclusive distributors. It acknowledges that it thus refused to supply Newitt's orders for France and that, following AWS's request, it took action to get its American subsidiary to stop supplies to Newitt. It regrets having taken such measures, which it now regards as 'incorrect', but takes the view that 'the matter should have been dealt with entirely through the mechanism of price and discount adjustment', which is not any more acceptable for the Commission (see recital 56 below).

3. Pricing measures (recitals 22 to 25, 34, 35 and 36)

(54) The fact that DSI no longer allowed Newitt to benefit from its export prices and that it reduced the discounts usually granted to Newitt constituted measures aimed at preventing Newitt from remaining competitive in relation to DSI's exclusive distributors on the export markets (32). These measures, which together had the effect of increasing Newitt's purchase prices by between 15 and over 50 % in the case of certain articles, efectively prevented it from continuing to export certain DSI products, such as tennis- and squash-balls, to other Community countries and compelled it to seek alternative sources of supply in third countries. As outlined in recital 34, these measures, which infringe Article 85 (1), were the result of close collaboration between DSI und AWS, and the level of the new prices charged to Newitt was specifically calculated to remove any incentive for that company to continue to export to the Benelux countries and to enable AWS to retain artificially its profit margins on the DSI products concerned.

(55) Certain documents show that, when it was impossible to raise the prices charged to British exporters - either for commercial reasons, or because the parallel imports had already taken place - DSI, in certain cases, subsidized the products of AWS byx covering part of the losses or loss of profit resulting from the 'special' prices which AWS was obliged to charge in order to combat such parallel imports. These ad hoc measures must be considered to be measures having an equivalent effect to the higher prices charged to British exporters.

(56) In its written and oral replies to the Statement of Objections, DSI defends the abovementioned pricing measures by referring to the specific costs borne by exclusive distributors and not borne by the parallel exporters. It thus argues that the measures taken in 1986 to 1987 against Newitt were intended merely to put an end to an unfair and commercially unjustified advantage whose origin was to be sought in a certain degree of management laxity prior to the takeover of DSI by BTR.

The Commission cannot accept this argument, for several reasons.

Firstly, it is not apparent (see Annex 3.1) that the prices charged to Newitt before the 1986 to 1988 measures gave it any unfair advantage, given the volumes involved, over DSI's other major wholesalers, selling mainly, or indeed virtually exclusively, on the UK market. During this entire period, the net prices charged to Newitt were, moreover, already significantly higher (some 9 to 12 %) than those charged to AWS (see Annex 3.3). On the contrary, the 1986 to 1988 measures affecting mainly Newitt, whose purchase prices exceeded those charged to smaller firms (Annex 3.1) and were at dissuasive levels compared with DSI's exclusive distributors (Annex 3.2 and 3.3), were in point of fact discriminatory in character.

The 'specific' costs referred to by DSI and cited during the hearing (33) do not, moreover, in any way properly derive from the function of exclusive distributor. Such costs are normal costs borne by any distribution firm, and their scale is primarily linked to the volume of turnover. The only particular costs of any scale which DSI's exclusive distributors have to bear, compared with independent firms, relate to advertising and promotional expenditure for the brand (some 6 % of its turnover according to AWS). However, it should firstly be noted that such expenditure is partly financed by DSI, which indeed makes a considerable contribution towards it.

In addition, such expenditure is certainly not without benefit to the exclusive distributor in so far as his name - and his title of 'exclusive' or 'official' distributor - are broadly associated with the brand in the advertising and promotional measures. If there are specific costs, they are thus counterbalanced by specific benefits.

At any rate, the view must be taken that any specific costs borne by exclusive distributors are largely offset by the granting of exclusivity, which constitutes a key commercial advantage. They do not justify the additional application to exclusive distributors of special prices intended to protect them from parallel imports.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the documents obtained from AWS show that it was not the economic considerations claimed by DSI in its written and oral replies to the Statement of Objections which guided it in the measures it took against parallel exporters. The setting of the relative prices for UK firms and exclusive distributors was never based on their respective commercial importance or even on the amount of the 'specific' costs referred to by DSI. Such relative prices were set precisely, in collusion with AWS, at the level which would remove any incentive for British firms to continue exporting. This was the only criterion, inended to prevent parallel imports, which was taken into consideration (34).

(57) AWS for its part maintains that it was DSI which decided to increase the prices charged to United Kingdom traders and that it sought only to reduce its purchasing prices, which could only stimulate competition.

It has been abundantly evident that AWS's requests were not intended to obtain pruchasing prices at an economically justified level, but the setting of an artificial ratio between them and the prices charged to British firms in order, on the contrary, to prevent all competition.

4. Buying-back of parallel imports (recitals 26 and 37)

(58) As indicated in recitals 26 and 37, the repurchasing by AWS of parallel imports of low-price tennis-rackets on sale in Dutch chain stores and the reimbursement by DSI of the difference between the buy-back price paid by AWS and the price it normally paid DSI were also carried out at AWS's request and involved close collaboration between the two companies. These concerted practices were designed to protect AWS from competition and to enable it to maintain a high level of prices. They prevented consumers from benefiting from the cheaper prices charged by the parallel exporters and clearly infringe Article 85 (1). THe same applies to the advertising and promotion campaigns organized by AWS, with the support of DSI, which were intended to heighten the dissuasive effect of the buy-back operations.

5. Product marking (recitals 27 and 28, 38 and 39)

(59) DSI marked its products with codes or marks in order to make it easier to identify parallel exporters, with a view to terminating their activities. DSI acknowledged this operation, and the documents obtained from AWS also show that AWS actively participated in efforts to identify such exporters. Such concerted practices, once again aimed at protecting the DSI distribution network from parallel imports, also infringe Article 85 (1).

6. Use of the tennis federation label for the benefit of exclusive distributors only (recitals 29 and 40)

(60) The printing of the initials of the Dutch tennis federation ('KNLTB official') only on tennis-balls sold to AWS and the use of stickers bearing the same message together with the legend 'the only approved and recommended tennis-ball' on the corresponding tins were intended to achieve two objectives. They were intended, on the one hand, to facilitate (by allowing immediate identification) the tracing of balls imported through parallel channels and, on the other, whatever DSI and AWS say, to give the DSI exclusive distribution network an edge over competitors by inducing consumers erroneously to believe that only the balls distributed by that network met the technical standards supposedly imposed by the federation (35) and, incidentally, that the higher prices charged were justified. These measures must be regarded as constituting concerted practices that infringe Article 85 (1), since DSI implemented them and bore the financial costs of them in response to urgent requests from AWS to identify and halt parallel imports into the Benelux countries.

The exclusivity agreement between the KNLTB and AWS (which AWS refers to in its written reply to the Statement of Objections) does not alter the facts of the situation. Regardless of the question of the compatibility of the exclusivity agreement with

Article 85

- a question on which the Commission has not expressed an opinion in this case, since it had no knowledge of the existence of the agreement - it has always been considered that the concerted use, within the framework of an exclusive distribution agreement, of an intellectual property right with the sole aim of impeding parallel imports constitutes an infringement of Article 85 (1) (36).

B. EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES

(61) The ban on exports contained in the DSI distribution agreements and conditions of sale had the direct object of impeding trade between Member States. The ban was a general one, in that it concerned all DSI products and all the Community countries. In view, moreover, of DSI's importance in the markets for sports equipment, especially the market for tennis, squash and golf equipment (37), the effect on trade between Member States was particularly appreciable.

(62) The concerted practices by DSI and AWS aimed at eliminating parallel imports into the Benelux countries also had the object of impeding trade between Member States. In many cases, they enabled such imports to be halted or cancelled their effects on prices, preventing consumers in those countries from enjoying lower prices than those charged by AWS. The concerted practices led to the virtual elimination of all exports by Newitt of Dunlop products to other Member States (38) and probably also to that of parallel exports by other UK traders.

II. Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83

(63) Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 provides that exclusive distribution agreements are in general exempt from the prohibition laid down in Article 85 (1) if they fulfil the conditions set out in the Regulation. The exclusive distribution agreements concluded by DSI do not, however, qualify for such block exemption as they impose on the parties obligations which are liable to restrict competition other than the restrictions authorized in Article 2 of the Regulation and because they are accompanied by an unwritten clause giving absolute territorial protection to DSI distributors. Furthermore, the implementation of the agreements also involves concerted practices. Both the provisions of the agreements and the concerted practices are caught by Article 3 (d) of the Regulation.

III. Article 85 (3)

(64) The DSI distribution agreements in the United Kingdom and in the other Member States were not notified to the Commission and do not therefore qualify for an individual exemption. In any event, even if they had been notified, they would not have qualified for such exemption in view of the export bans aimed at total territorial protection which they contain and which are not indispensable to the effectiveness of DSI's distribution system.

IV. Article 3 of Regulation No 17

(65) Pursuant to Article 3 (1) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may, if it finds that there has been an infringement of Article 85, require by decision that the undertakings concerned bring such infringement to an end.

(66) DSI is required, if it has not already done so, to terminate the export bans governing its sales agreements in the United Kingdom and the absolute territorial protection included in the exclusive distribution agreements it has in other Member States. It is also required to terminate the various measures (notably as regards prices) applied to Newitt and other UK traders with a view to preventing them from exporting, thus protecting its exclusive distributors.

V. Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17

(67) Pursuant to Article 15 (2) (a) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may, by decision, impose fines of from ECU 1 000 to 1 000 000 or a sum in excess thereof, but not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the previous business year, on undertakings which, either intentionally or negligently, infringe Article 85. In setting the amount of the fine, regard must be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.

(68) DSI could not have been unaware that the export ban (which applied to all its products and all the Member States) governing its distribution agreements and conditions of sale infringed Article 85 (1) and that the Court of Justice and the Commission have always regarded such bans, which undermine one of the fundamental objectives of the EEC Treaty, as particularly serious infrngements. DSI and AWS could not have been unaware that the same applied to the various concerted practices employed in order to prevent parallel imports into the Benelux countries. Consequently, a fine should be imposed on DSI and AWS.

(69) Neither the communication of Newitt's complaint to DSI in June 1987 nor the formal warning given by the Commission in October 1987 against these restrictions on exports induced DSI to change its behaviour (39). The only response which the communication of Newitt's complaint to DSI appears to have evoked was that DSI sent a letter to its distributors on 12 August 1987 requesting them to coordinate their replies to any questions the Commission might ask.

In its written and oral replies to the Statement of Objections, by contrast, DSI acknowledge that a number (but not all) of the measures it had taken constituted infringements of the competition rules, said that it regretted this and announced that it would take a series of corrective measures, namely instructions to its staff and exclusive distributors, new distribution agreements and new conditions of sale (40). However, at the same time, it made clear its intention of continuing to protect its exclusive distributors through a system of differentiated prices or discounts (41).

(70) Account must be taken of the fact that the infringements committed by DSI date back to at least 1977 (see the letter dated 14 December 1977 stressing that Dunlop products supplied to Newitt may not be exported) (42) and that they stopped in 1990, except in the case of the measures relating to prices. Account must also be taken of the fact that the infringements committed by AWS date back to at least 1985 (see the telexes dated 1 February and 29 April 1985 showing that AWS was noting the identification codes on Dunlop rackets and the telex dated 27 February 1986 in which it states that it agreed to DSI's pricing policy in 1985 only on the express condition that DSI had 'its distribution under control') and that the infringements stopped in April 1989, the date on which AWS ceased to be DSI's exclusive distributor.

(71) In setting the amount of the fine, the Commission has also taken account of the fact that, although the export ban governing DSI's distribution agreements was general and covered all products, the concerted practices engaged in with AWS were apparently (on the basis of the information available to the Commission) limited to only some of the products (tennis-balls, squash-balls, tennis-rackets and golfing equipment). The Commission has also taken DSI's importance on the relevant markets into consideration.

As regards AWS, the Commission has taken account of the financial problems which it has encouraged and which have culminated in a takeover,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Schedules & Appendices

ANNEX 1.1

First-grade tennis-balls - Market shares and dimensions in the Community (1) - 1989

(%)

Member States Market Dimension (' 000 dozen) Dunlop Slazenger Total DSI Penn Wilson Tretorn Dunlop France Others Belgium/

Luxembourg 160 5 12 17 14 5 44 3 17 Denmark 45 5 25 30 15 5 33 - 17 Ireland 20 35 8 43 37 8 10 - 2 France 1 800 5 10 15 16 3 5 48 13 Germany 1 700 57 7 64 12 4 12 - 8 (Pirelli: 7) Greece 10 40 5 45 20 15 15 - 5 Netherlands 210 38 21 59 12 3 20 2 4 Italy 540 28 5 33 10 6 20 4 27 (Pirelli: 25) Portugal 12 30 10 40 32 8 - 10 10 Spain 180 18 3 21 31 19 2 20 7 United Kingdom 290 11 39 50 20 25 5 - - Total EEC 4 967 28 11 39 16 6 11 19 9

ANNEX 1.2

Squash-balls - Market shares in the Community (1) - 1989

( %)

Member States Dunlop Slazenger Total DSI Belgium/Luxembourg 33 17 50 Denmark - - - Ireland 85 - 85 France - 10 10 Germany 43 3 46 Netherlands 50 5 55 Italy 53 15 68 Portugal - - - Spain 80 10 90 United Kingdom 70 10 80 Greece - - - Total EEC 56 7 63

(1) DSI estimates and commercial audits.

ANNEX 2

DSI - United Kingdom domestic price-list and export price-list - Differentials for tennis-balls and squash-balls - United Kingdom domestic list price = 100

Dunlop Slazenger Date Tennis-balls (1) Squash-balls (2) Date Tennis-balls (3) Squash-balls (4) United Kingdom price (a) Export price (b) United Kingdom price Export price United Kingdom price Export price United Kingdom price Export price £ Index £ Index £ Index £ Index £ Index £ Index £ Index £ Index 1982 1982 1. 9 ? 7,87 5,07 1. 10 ? 8,30 ? 4,50 - 1983 1983 1. 3 / 1. 4 8,55 100 8,26 (7,87) (*) 96,6 6,05 100 5,58 92,2 31. 1 8,15 100 101,8 5,20 100 86,5 1. 10 8,67 (7,87) 101,4 5,58 92,2 3. 10 8,98 9,15 101,9 6,66 100 5,20 78,1 1984 1984 1. 10 / 1. 11 9,40 100 9,10 (7,87) 96,8 6,66 100 5,58 83,8 2. 4 8,98 101,9 6,66 100 78,1 1. 10 9,40 97,3 6,66 100 78,1 1985 1985 25. 2 / 4. 3 9,40 100 9,10 96,8 8,08 100 5,58 69,1 4. 3 9,40 ? ? 6,66 100 ? ? 1. 9 / 1. 10 10,45 100 10,20 97,6 8,08 100 5,58 69,1 1. 10 10,45 ? ? 6,66 100 ? ? 2. 12 11,20 100 91,1 1986 1986 2. 4 11,90 100 85,7 8,08 69,1 1. 3 / 2. 4 11,20 10,75 96,0 6,66 100 5,58 83,8 1. 9 / 29. 9 11,90 100 11,00 92,4 8,08 100 5,75 71,2 1. 9 / 29. 9 11,90 11,00 92,4 6,66 100 5,75 86,3 1987 1987 13. 4 11,90 100 92,4 8,75 65,7 13. 4 11,90 92,4 6,66 86,3 1. 7 6,20 70,9 1. 7 6,20 93,1 1. 9 / 28. 9 12,40 100 11,75 94,8 8,75 70,9 1. 9 / 28. 9 12,40 11,75 94,8 6,66 6,20 93,1 1988 1988 1. 4 12,40 100 94,8 9,09 68,2 1. 4 12,40 94,8 6,66 93,1 1. 7 6,65 73,2 1. 9 / 3. 10 13,02 13,15 101,0 6,66 6,90 1. 9 / 3. 10 13,02 100 13,15 101,0 6,65 73,2 1989 1989 3. 4 13,02 100 101,0 3. 4 13,02 101,0 1. 7 9,54 7,10 74,4 1. 7 6,66 6,90 103,6 1. 9 / 2. 10 13,02 100 13,15 101,0 9,54 74,4 1. 9 / 2. 10 13,02 13,14 100,9 6,66 103,6

(a) Carriage paid.

(b) fob.

(*) Figures supplied by Newitt.

(1) Dunlop Fort 601.331 (1. 9. 1982-1. 10. 1983) - 601.332 and 601.330 (1. 10. 1984-2. 12. 1985) - 601.336 (2. 4. 1986-1. 9. 1988) - Dunlop T.P. 601.362 (since 1. 9. 1989).

(2) Black Yellow Dot 750 890 (1. 9. 1982-1. 10. 1984) - XX Black Yellow Dot 750 440 (since 4. 3. 1985).

(3) Slazenger Yellow 340 430 (1. 10. 1982-1. 9. 1986) - 340 454 (since 1. 9. 1986).

(4) Navy Blue Yellow Dot 419 043 (1. 10. 1982-4. 3. 1985) - 419 047 (1. 10. 1985-2. 4. 1986) - 419 173 (since 1. 9. 1986).

ANNEX 3.1.

DSI first-grade tennis-balls - Volumes/Prices/Discounts

Date United Kingdom List price (A) Export List price (B) AWS (Benelux) (export price only) Newitt (United Kingdom and export price) . . . (*) (United Kingdom price only) . . . (United Kingdom price only) . . . (United Kingdom price only) ' 000 dozen Price Discount on B ' 000 dozen Price Discount ' 000 dozen Price Discount on A ' 000 dozen Price Discount on A ' 000 dozen Price Discount on A on B on A 1984 8,55 8,67 1/11 9,40 9,10 1985 9,40 9,10 1/9 10,45 10,20 2/12 11,20 10,20 1986 11,20 10,20 2/4 11,90 10,20 1/9 11,90 11,00 1987 11,90 11,00 1/9 12,40 11,75 1988 12,40 11,75 1/9 13,02 13,15 1989 13,02 13,15

1. Year-end figures.

2. Price = weighted average price.

3. AWS 1989 sales: January-April only (distribution agreements terminated).

Source: DSI.

(*) In the published version of the Decision, some information has hereinafter been omitted, pursuant to the provisions of Article 21 of Regulation No 17 concerning non-disclosure of business secrets.

ANNEX 3.2

DSI 'first-grade' tennis-balls - Volumes/Prices/Discounts

Date Export list price Benelux three distributors Italy two distributors Spain two distributors Newitt ' 000 dozen Price Discount ' 000 dozen Price Discount ' 000 dozen Price Discount ' 000 dozen Price Discount 1984 8,67 1/11 9,10 1985 9,10 1/9 10,20 1986 10,20 1/9 11,00 1987 11,00 1/9 11,75 1988 11,75 1/9 13,15 1989 13,15

1. Sales in Spain in 1984 were affected by late purchases in 1983 (total 1983 = [. . .] dozen).

Source: DSI.

ANNEX 3.3

Ratio of prices charged to Newitt and to certain DSI exclusive distributors - Index

Year Newitt price AWS price Newitt price Italian distributor price Newitt price Spanish distributor price 1984 109 100 94 100 101 100 1985 112 100 104 100 109 100 1986 121 100 113 100 116 100 1987 123 100 115 100 117 100 1988 134 100 123 100 124 100 1989 123 100 120 100 140 100