Decision (EU) 2023/2530 of the European Central Bank of 28 September 2023 on the delegation of the power to adopt decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures of national competent authorities or national designated authorities (ECB/2023/24)
Decision (EU) 2023/2530 of the European Central Bank of 28 September 2023 on the delegation of the power to adopt decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures of national competent authorities or national designated authorities (ECB/2023/24)
Decision (EU) 2023/2530 · Decision · 8 articles
Data as of 2026-07-04 · Compiled from an official source version. Later amendments or repeals may not be reflected; the official text prevails. · Read the official text ↗
For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions apply:
(1)
‘intended macroprudential measures’ means the measures that national competent authorities (NCAs) and national designated authorities (NDAs) intend to apply to require banks to maintain O-SII or G-SII buffers, in accordance with Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) , as formally notified to the ECB for decision whether or not to object;
(2)
‘O-SII buffer’ means the own funds that are required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU;
(3)
‘G-SII buffer’ means the own funds that are required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(4) of Directive 2013/36/EU;
(4)
‘ECB’s technical assessment’ means the independent technical assessment conducted by the ECB exercising judgement as to the appropriate buffer rates;
(5)
‘ECB floor’ means the latest applicable version of the ECB floor methodology for assessing O-SII buffers as adopted by the Governing Council and based on banks’ systemic importance score, which allocates each bank to one of several categories of systemic importance (‘buckets’) whereby each bucket is associated with a specific O-SII buffer that should be considered as a floor;
(6)
‘sensitivity’ or ‘sensitive’ means a characteristic or factor that may have a negative impact on the ECB’s reputation and/or on the effective and consistent functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, including but not limited to any of the following: (a) substantial concerns expressed in the relevant committee and the relevant internal structure in their deliberations not included in the ECB’s technical assessment; (b) intended macroprudential measures that may attract negative media or public attention.
1. This Decision specifies the criteria for the delegation of decision-making powers to the heads of work units of the ECB for the adoption of decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures.
2. The delegation of decision-making powers is without prejudice to the ECB’s technical assessment performed for the purposes of adopting decisions not to object to the intended macroprudential measures referred to in paragraph 1.
Delegation of the power to adopt decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures
1. The Governing Council hereby delegates the power to adopt decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures to the heads of work units nominated by the Executive Board.
2. Decisions not to object to the intended macroprudential measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be adopted by means of a delegated decision where the criteria for the adoption of delegated decisions set out in Articles 4 and 5, as relevant, are met.
3. The decision not to object to the intended macroprudential measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be adopted by means of a delegated decision where the complexity of the ECB’s technical assessment or the sensitivity of the measures requires the decision to be adopted in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and Article 13h of Decision ECB/2004/2.
4. Where any member of the relevant committee or ECB internal structure expresses concerns as to the substance of the intended macroprudential measures referred to in paragraph 1 while being consulted on a draft delegated decision, the criteria of Articles 4 and 5, as relevant, shall be deemed to have not been met and/or the measures shall be deemed to be sensitive within the meaning of Article 1, point 6, of this Decision.
Criteria for the adoption of delegated decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting an O-SII buffer
Decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting an O-SII buffer shall be adopted in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, where all of the following criteria are met:
(a)
those intended macroprudential measures apply the latest methodology for determining the ECB floor;
(b)
the ECB’s technical assessment of those measures does not give rise to any concerns as regards the following:
(i)
the methodology employed by the NCA or NDA;
(ii)
the economic considerations driving the setting of O-SII buffers;
(iii)
the identification of O-SIIs;
(c)
the ECB’s technical assessment does not conclude that the ECB should object to those intended macroprudential measures.
Criteria for the adoption of delegated decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting a G-SII buffer
Decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting a G-SII buffer shall be adopted in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, where those intended macroprudential measures by NCAs or NDAs concerning the G-SII buffer rates are in line with the ECB’s annual Assessment of SSM Area G-SIBs-G-SIIs and with the global agreement reached by the members of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board.
Recording of and reporting on delegated decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures
1. The Secretariat of the Supervisory Board shall keep a record of any delegated decisions taken in accordance with this Decision and shall inform the Secretariat of the Governing Council of such decisions on a monthly basis.
2. The Secretariat of the Governing Council shall submit a quarterly report on the exercise of delegated decision-making powers in relation to the intended macroprudential measures to the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board.
