ANNEX
OPCW’s Institutional Transitional Planning for Non-Routine Missions and Investigative Capacities
1. Background and Rationale
In December 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (EU Strategy), in which it recognised the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to international peace and security. The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and of the OPCW in creating a world free of chemical weapons. The objectives of the EU Strategy are complementary to those of the CWC. The EU and the OPCW, since the adoption of the EU Strategy, have pursued cooperation including engagement through a series of Joint Actions and Decisions. ( 1 )
The OPCW has received consistent support from the EU in the implementation of its mandate, reflecting a continued commitment to the full implementation of the CWC, with 43,6M EUR of voluntary contributions through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint Actions and Decisions approved since 2004. The OPCW welcomes the EU’s continued commitment to supporting OPCW’s efforts to fulfil the goal of the Convention – a world free of chemical weapons, thus contributing to international peace and security. The OPCW further recognises EU support through financing since 2004 covering varied areas such as: application of the verification regime and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, promotion of universality, implementation of the CWC by States Parties, international cooperation for chemical activities, preparedness to prevent and respond to attacks involving toxic chemicals, developments in the field of science and technology, cyber security, construction of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology, situation awareness and satellite imagery products, and addressing the threats of chemical weapons use. Furthermore, recognising emerging challenges in countering re-emergence of chemical weapons, the OPCW also welcomes the EU’s sustained interest in strengthening its support to the institutionalisation of OPCW’s investigative and verification capacities.
Following the end of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles in July 2023, the OPCW has continued its adaptation to the post-destruction phase. Accordingly, the Secretariat of the OPCW has initiated a knowledge mapping for processes related to ensuring retention of the Secretariat capacities related to effective response to use of chemical weapons and allegations thereof.
This proposal is to be considered in conjunction with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344, 26 June 2023, (EU2023), and the activities under Output 3 (‘Effective responses to allegations of chemical weapons use’). Activities in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344, are primarily in relation to the conduct of pending/on-going investigations. This proposal focuses on obligations and activities occurring after the conclusion of investigations and issuance of reports.
The proposal for 2024 CFSP funding is aligned with the OPCW and Technical Secretariat’s priorities associated with knowledge acquisition, expertise integration, with the detailing of information security processes and procedures to date, as well as in response to the risk of developments in science and technology which impact chemical weapons use and the threats thereof. In concrete terms, the proposal seeks to capture the outcomes of the conduct of independent and impartial investigative activities, and, inter alia, the related documentation obligations mandated under the decision of the Conference of the States Parties C-SS-4/DEC.3, para 12, adopted on 27 June 2018, and C-28/Dec.12 adopted on 30 November 2023. In furtherance of efforts made by the Secretariat in implementing modalities under para 21 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, and in line with para 2 of C-28/Dec.12, the Conference of States Parties has requested the Secretariat to continue efforts to sustain and build its capabilities to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons, including through the further development of tools and methodologies such as those related to forensics, witness interviews, evidence collection, chain of custody, the planning and conduct of regular training and other relevant exercises, the integration and retention of knowledge, skills and expertise accumulated through the conduct of previous missions, and by any other means the Director-General deems necessary and appropriate.
The OPCW 2024-2025 Biennial Programme and Budget was adopted at the 28th Conference of States Parties (27 Nov – 1 Dec 2023). It includes the ongoing transformation of the Inspectorate Division. This adaptation seeks to incorporate and integrate the knowledge and expertise gained through non-routine missions conducted in Syria and beyond, so as to embed this distinctive capacity through trainings within the relevant existing Secretariat structures and respond in the benefit of States Parties upon request. This transition period will require complementary voluntary contributions, of which the EU proposal will partially finance, in addition to resources available through the 2024-2025 Programme and Budget to accelerate the implementation of the below objectives and activities, as well as through the use of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology.
2. Overall Objectives of the Proposed Action
The overall objective of the EU Council Decision would be to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to respond effectively and credibly to chemical weapons use and allegations thereof. Such support would contribute to the implementation of OPCW’s mandates. It would also enable timely participation in the implementation of OPCW’s obligations under the CWC, in relation to international accountability efforts against the use of chemical weapons.
3. Specific Objectives of the Action
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Integration of knowledge and expertise for investigative methodologies, protocols and activities (e.g., deployments etc.);
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Continued compliance with evidentiary information sharing, as mandated in C-SS-4/DEC.3 (para 12), to preserve and provide information to relevant investigatory entities.
4. Expected Outputs of the Action
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Output 1: Integration of OPCW’s preparedness and response capacities institutionally for any new chemical weapons use or allegation thereof and to new and/or emergent risks. With the following indicative activities:
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Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme.
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Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.).
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Output 2: Enabling and strengthening the transfer of evidentiary information to the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) in relation to issued reports of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in line with C-SS-4/ DEC.3 para 12, and in support of international accountability for the use of chemical weapons. With the following indicative activities:
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Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM
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Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files.
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Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
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Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
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Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
5. Final Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries include: OPCW Secretariat personnel and teams; and CWC stakeholders including States Parties, National Authorities, Civil Society, International and Intergovernmental Organisations, etc.
6. Duration
Expenditures funded through this project are expected to be incurred and concluded over a 24-month implementation period.
( 1 ) Inclusive of Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP (expired); Decision 2009/569/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2012/166/CFSP (expired); Decision 2013/726/CFSP (expired); Decision 2015/259 (extended with Decision 2018/294 and expired); Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 (expired); Decision 2017/2302 (extended with Decision 2019/1092, expired); Decision 2017/2303 (extended with Decision 2018/1943 and Decision 2019/2112, expired); Decision 2019/538 (extended with Decision 2022/573, expired); Decision 2021/1026 (extended with Decision 2023/1515, in force through August 2024), and Decision 2021/2073 (in force through Dec 2025); Decision 2023/1344 (in force through June 2026).
