The Fair Labor Standards Act is a Federal statute of general application which establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, equal pay, and child labor requirements that apply as provided in the Act. These requirements are applicable, except where exemptions are provided, to employees in those workweeks when they are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce or are employed in enterprises so engaged within the meaning of definitions set forth in the Act. Employers having such employees are required to comply with the Act's provisions in this regard unless relieved therefrom by some exemption in the Act, and with specified recordkeeping requirements contained in part 516 of this chapter. The law authorizes the Department of Labor to investigate for compliance and, in the event of violations, to supervise the payment of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee. The law also provides for enforcement in the courts.
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EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Act provides a number of specific exemptions from the general requirements described in § 780.1. Some are exemptions from the overtime provisions only. Others are from the child labor provisions only. Several are exemptions from both the minimum wage and the overtime requirements of the Act. Finally, there are some exemptions from all three—minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor requirements. An employer who claims an exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies ( Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290). Conditions specified in the language of the Act are “explicit prerequisites to exemption” ( Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388). “The details with which the exemptions in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by implication” and “no matter how broad the exemption, it is meant to apply only to” the specified activities ( Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 607; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Exemptions provided in the Act “are to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert them” and their application limited to those who come “plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit” ( Phillips v. Walling, 334 U.S. 490; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290; Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388).
(a) The specific exemptions which the Act provides for employment in agriculture and in certain operations more or less closely connected with the agricultural industry are discussed in this part 780. These exemptions differ substantially in their terms, scope, and methods of application. Each of them is therefore separately considered in a subpart of this part which, together with this subpart A, constitutes the official interpretative bulletin of the Department of Labor with respect to that exemption. Exemptions from minimum wages and overtime pay and the subparts in which they are considered include the section 13(a)(6) exemptions for employees on small farms, family members, local hand harvest laborers, migrant hand harvest workers under 16, and range production employees discussed in subpart D of this part, and the section 13(a)(14) exemption for agricultural employees processing shade-grown tobacco discussed in subpart F of this part.
(b) Exemptions from the overtime pay provisions and the subparts in which these exemptions are discussed include the section 13(b)(12) exemption (agriculture and irrigation) discussed in subpart E of this part, the section 13(b)(13) exemption (agriculture and livestock auction operations) discussed in subpart G of this part, the section 13(b)(14) exemption (country elevators) discussed in subpart H of this part, the section 13(b)(15) exemption (cotton ginning and sugar processing) discussed in subpart I of this part, and the section 13(b)(16) exemption (fruit and vegetable harvest transportation) discussed in subpart J of this part.
(c) An exemption in section 13(d) of the Act from the minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor provisions for certain homeworkers making holly and evergreen wreaths is discussed in subpart K of this part.
The application of provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act other than the exemptions referred to in § 780.3 is not considered in this part 780. Interpretative bulletins published elsewhere in the Code of Federal Regulations deal with such subjects as the general coverage of the Act (part 776 of this chapter) and of the child labor provisions (subpart G of part 1500 of this title which includes a discussion of the exemption for children employed in agriculture outside of school hours), partial overtime exemptions provided for industries of a seasonal nature under sections 7(c) and 7(d) (part 526 of this chapter) and for industries with marked seasonal peaks of operations under section 7(d) (part 526 of this chapter), methods of payment of wages (part 531 of this chapter), computation and payment of overtime compensation (part 778 of this chapter), and hours worked (part 785 of this chapter). Regulations on recordkeeping are contained in part 516 of this chapter and regulations defining exempt administrative, executive, and professional employees, and outside salesmen are contained in part 541 of this chapter. Regulations and interpretations on other subjects concerned with the application of the Act are listed in the table of contents to this chapter. Copies of any of these documents may be obtained from any office of the Wage and Hour Division.
The regulations in this part contain the official interpretations of the Department of Labor with respect to the application under described circumstances of the provisions of law which they discuss. These interpretations indicate the construction of the law which the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator believe to be correct and which will guide them in the performance of their duties under the Act unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude, upon reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect.
The ultimate decisions on interpretations of the Act are made by the courts ( Mitchell v. Zachry, 362 U.S. 310; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517). Court decisions supporting interpretations contained in this bulletin are cited where it is believed they may be helpful. On matters which have not been determined by the courts, it is necessary for the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator to reach conclusions as to the meaning and the application of provisions of the law in order to carry out their responsibilities of administration and enforcement ( Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134). In order that these positions may be made known to persons who may be affected by them, official interpretations are issued by the Administrator on the advice of the Solicitor of Labor, as authorized by the Secretary (Reorg. Pl. 6 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1263; Gen. Ord. 45A, May 24, 1950; 15 FR 3290; Secretary's Order 13-71, May 4, 1971, FR; Secretary's Order 15-71, May 4, 1971, FR). Interpretative rules under the Act as amended in 1966 are also authorized by section 602 of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 (80 Stat. 830), which provides: “On and after the date of the enactment of this Act the Secretary is authorized to promulgate necessary rules, regulations, or orders with regard to the amendments made by this Act.” As included in the regulations in this part, these interpretations are believed to express the intent of the law as reflected in its provisions and as construed by the courts and evidenced by its legislative history. References to pertinent legislative history are made in this bulletin where it appears that they will contribute to a better understanding of the interpretations.
The interpretations of the law contained in this part are official interpretations which may be relied upon as provided in section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that such interpretations of this Act “provide a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it” and “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Further, as stated by the Court: “Good administration of the Act and good judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforcement and those for determining private rights shall be at variance only where justified by very good reasons.” ( Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134). Some of the interpretations in this part are interpretations of exemption provisions as they appeared in the original Act before amendment in 1949, 1961, and 1966, which have remained unchanged because they are consistent with the amendments. These interpretations may be said to have congressional sanction because “When Congress amended the Act in 1949 it provided that pre-1949 rulings and interpretations by the Administrator should remain in effect unless inconsistent with the statute as amended. 63 Stat. 920.” ( Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290; accord, Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254.)
On and after publication of this part 780 in the Federal Register, the interpretations contained therein shall be in effect and shall remain in effect until they are modified, rescinded, or withdrawn. This part supersedes and replaces the interpretations previously published in the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations as this part 780. Prior opinions, rulings, and interpretations and prior enforcement policies which are not inconsistent with the interpretations in this part or with the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 are continued in effect; all other opinions, rulings, interpretations, and enforcement policies on the subjects discussed in the interpretations in this part are rescinded and withdrawn. The interpretations in this part provide statements of general principles applicable to the subjects discussed and illustrations of the application of these principles to situations that frequently arise. They do not and cannot refer specifically to every problem which may be met in the consideration of the exemptions discussed. The omission to discuss a particular problem in this part or in interpretations supplementing it should not be taken to indicate the adoption of any position by the Secretary of Labor or the Administrator with respect to such problem or to constitute an administrative interpretation or practice or enforcement policy. Questions on matters not fully covered by this bulletin may be addressed to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, or to any Regional Office of the Division.
The interpretations contained in the several subparts of this part 780 consider separately a number of exemptions which affect employees who perform activities in or connected with agriculture and its products. These exemptions deal with related subject matter and varying degrees of relationships between them were the subject of consideration in Congress before their enactment. Together they constitute an expression in some detail of existing Federal policy on the lines to be drawn in the industries connected with agriculture and agricultural products between those employees to whom the pay provisions of the Act are to be applied and those whose exclusion in whole or in part from the Act's requirements has been deemed justified. The courts have indicated that these exemptions, because of their relationship to one another, should be construed together insofar as possible so that they form a consistent whole. Consideration of the language and history of a related exemption or exemptions is helpful in ascertaining the intended scope and application of an exemption whose effect might otherwise not be clear ( Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 607; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Bowie v. Gonzales (C.A. 1), 117 F. 2d 11). In the interpretations of the several exemptions discussed in the various subparts of this part 780, effect has been given to these principles and each exemption has been considered in its relation to others in the group as well as to the combined effect of the group as a whole.
The workweek is the unit of time to be taken as the standard in determining the applicability of an exemption. An employee's workweek is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours—seven consecutive 24-hour periods. It need not coincide with the calendar week. If in any workweek an employee does only exempt work, he is exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the Act during that workweek, irrespective of the nature of his work in any other workweek or workweeks. An employee may thus be exempt in 1 workweek and not in the next. But the burden of effecting segregation between exempt and nonexempt work as between particular workweeks is upon the employer.
Where an employee in the same workweek performs work which is exempt under one section of the Act and also engages in work to which the Act applies but is not exempt under some other section of the Act, he is not exempt that week, and the wage and hour requirements of the Act are applicable (see Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913; Mitchell v. Maxfield, 12 WH Cases 792 (S.D. Ohio), 29 Labor Cases 69, 781; Jordan v. Stark Bros. Nurseries, 45 F. Supp. 769; McComb v. Puerto Rico Tobacco Marketing Co-op Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 953, affirmed 181 F. 2d 697; Walling v. Peacock Corp., 58 F. Supp. 880-883). On the other hand, an employee who performs exempt activities during a workweek will not lose the exemption by virtue of the fact that he performs other activities outside the scope of the exemption if the other activities are not covered by the Act.
The combination (tacking) of exempt work under one exemption with exempt work under another exemption is permitted. For instance, the overtime pay requirements are not considered applicable to an employee who does work within section 13(b)(12) for only part of a workweek if all of the covered work done by him during the remainder of the workweek is within one or more equivalent exemptions under other provisions of the Act. If the scope of such exemptions is not the same, however, the exemption applicable to the employee is equivalent to that provided by whichever exemption provision is more limited in scope. For instance, an employee who devotes part of a workweek to work within section 13(b)(12) and the remainder to work exempt under section 7(c) must receive the minimum wage and must be paid time and one-half for his overtime work during that week for hours over 10 a day or 50 a week, whichever provides the greater compensation. Each activity is tested separately under the applicable exemption as though it were the sole activity of the employee for the whole workweek in question. The availability of a combination exemption depends on whether the employee meets all the requirements of each exemption which is sought to combine.
Subpart A of this part 780, this subpart B and subparts C, D, and E of this part together constitute the official interpretative bulletin of the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application of sections 3(f), 13(a)(6), and 13(b)(12) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended. Section 3(f) defines “agriculture” as the term is used in the Act. Section 13(a)(6) provides exemption from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Act for certain employees employed in “agriculture,” as so defined. Section 13(b)(12) provides an overtime exemption for any employee employed in agriculture. As appears more fully in subpart A of this part 780, interpretations in this bulletin with respect to the provisions of the Act discussed are official interpretations upon which reliance may be placed and which will guide the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator in the performance of their duties under the Act.
It is the purpose of the interpretative bulletins in this part to provide an official statement of the views of the Department of Labor with respect to the application and meaning of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, which exempt certain employees from the minimum wage or overtime pay requirements, or both, when employed in agriculture or in certain related activities or in certain operations with respect to agricultural or horticultural commodities.
Section 3(f) defines “agriculture” as this term is used in the Act. Those principles and rules which govern the interpretation of the meaning and application of the Act's definition of “agriculture” in section 3(f) and of the terms used in it are set forth in this subpart B. Included is a discussion of the application of the definition in section 3(f) to the employees of farmers' cooperative associations. In addition, the official interpretations of section 3(f) of the Act and the terms which appear in it are to be taken into consideration in determining the meaning intended by the use of like terms in particular related exemptions which are provided by the Act.
Section 6(a)(5) of the Act provides that any employee employed in agriculture must be paid at least $1.30 an hour beginning February 1, 1969. However, there are certain exemptions provided in the Act for agricultural workers, as previously mentioned. (See §§ 780.3 and 780.4.)
Section 3(f) of the Act defines “agriculture” as follows:
“Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.
The effect of modern specialization on agriculture has been discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:
Whether a particular type of activity is agricultural depends, in large measure, upon the way in which that activity is organized in a particular society. The determination cannot be made in the abstract. In less advanced societies the agricultural function includes many types of activity which, in others, are not agricultural. The fashioning of tools, the provision of fertilizer, the processing of the product, to mention only a few examples, are functions which, in some societies, are performed on the farm by farmers as part of their normal agricultural routine. Economic progress, however, is characterized by a progressive division of labor and separation of function. Tools are made by a tool manufacturer, who specializes in that kind of work and supplies them to the farmer. The compost heap is replaced by factory produced fertilizers. Power is derived from electricity and gasoline rather than supplied by the farmer's mules. Wheat is ground at the mill. In this way functions which are necessary to the total economic process of supplying an agricultural produce become, in the process of economic development and specialization, separate and independent productive functions operated in conjunction with the agricultural function but no longer a part of it. Thus the question as to whether a particular type of activity is agricultural is not determined by the necessity of the activity to agriculture nor by the physical similarity of the activity to that done by farmers in other situations. The question is whether the activity in the particular case is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent productive activity. The farmhand who cares for the farmer's mules or prepares his fertilizer is engaged in agriculture. But the maintenance man in a powerplant and the packer in a fertilizer factory are not employed in agriculture, even if their activity is necessary to farmers and replaces work previously done by farmers. The production of power and the manufacture of fertilizer are independent productive functions, not agriculture (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 cf. Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).
(a) Section 3(f) of the Act contains a very comprehensive definition of the term “agriculture.” The definition has two distinct branches (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755). One has relation to the primary meaning of agriculture; the other gives to the term a somewhat broader secondary meaning for purposes of the Act ( NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714).
(b) First, there is the primary meaning. This includes farming in all its branches. Listed as being included “among other things” in the primary meaning are certain specific farming operations such as cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities and the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals or poultry. If an employee is employed in any of these activities, he is engaged in agriculture regardless of whether he is employed by a farmer or on a farm. ( Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, supra; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398.)
(c) Then there is the secondary meaning of the term. The second branch includes operations other than those which fall within the primary meaning of the term. It includes any practices, whether or not they are themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with “such” farming operations ( Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, supra; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).
(d) Employment not within the scope of either the primary or the secondary meaning of “agriculture” as defined in section 3(f) is not employment in agriculture. In other words, employees not employed in farming or by a farmer or on a farm are not employed in agriculture.
When an employee is engaged in direct farming operations included in the primary definition of “agriculture,” the purpose of the employer in performing the operations is immaterial. For example, where an employer owns a factory and a farm and operates the farm only for experimental purposes in connection with the factory, those employees who devote all their time during a particular workweek to the direct farming operations, such as the growing and harvesting of agricultural commodities, are considered as employed in agriculture. It is also immaterial whether the agricultural or horticultural commodities are grown in enclosed houses, as in greenhouses or mushroom cellars, or in an open field. Similarly, the mere fact that production takes place in a city or on industrial premises, such as in hatcheries, rather than in the country or on premises possessing the normal characteristics of a farm makes no difference (see Jordan v. Stark Brothers Nurseries, 45 F. Supp. 769; Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer, 131 F. 2d 283; Damutz v. Pinchbeck, 158 F. 2d 882).
The language “farming in all its branches” includes all activities, whether listed in the definition or not, which constitute farming or a branch thereof under the facts and circumstances.
Section 3(f), in defining the practices included as “agriculture” in its statutory secondary meaning, refers to the activities specifically listed in the earlier portion of the definition (the “primary” meaning) as “farming” operations. They may therefore be considered as illustrative of “farming in all its branches” as used in the definition.
Unlike the specifically enumerated operations, the phrase “farming in all its branches” does not clearly indicate its scope. In determining whether an operation constitutes “farming in all its branches,” it may be necessary to consider various circumstances such as the nature and purpose of the operations of the employer, the character of the place where the employee performs his duties, the general types of activities there conducted, and the purpose and function of such activities with respect to the operations carried on by the employer. The determination may involve a consideration of the principles contained in § 780.104. For example, fish farming activities fall within the scope of the meaning of “farming in all its branches” and employers engaged in such operations would be employed in agriculture. On the other hand, so-called “bird dog” operations of the citrus fruit industry consisting of the purchase of fruit unsuitable for packing and of the transportation and sale of the fruit to canning plants do not qualify as “farming” and, consequently, employees engaged in such operations are not employed in agriculture. (See Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363 cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897.) However, employees gathering the fruit at the groves are considered agricultural workers because they are engaged in harvesting operations. (For exempt transportation, see subpart J of this part.)
“Cultivation and tillage of the soil” includes all the operations necessary to prepare a suitable seedbed, eliminate weed growth, and improve the physical condition of the soil. Thus, grading or leveling land or removing rock or other matter to prepare the ground for a proper seedbed or building terraces on farmland to check soil erosion are included. The application of water, fertilizer, or limestone to farmland is also included. (See in this connection §§ 780.128 et seq. Also see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.) Other operations such as the commercial production and distribution of fertilizer are not included within the scope of agriculture. ( McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 165 F. 2d 824; Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.)
“Dairying” includes the work of caring for and milking cows or goats. It also includes putting the milk in containers, cooling it, and storing it where done on the farm. The handling of milk and cream at receiving stations is not included. Such operations as separating cream from milk, bottling milk and cream, or making butter and cheese may be considered as “dairying” under some circumstances, or they may be considered practices under the “secondary” meaning of the definition when performed by a farmer or on a farm, if they are not performed on milk produced by other farmers or produced on other farms. (See the discussions in §§ 780.128 et seq. )
Section 3(f) of the Act defines as “agriculture” the “production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting” of “agricultural or horticultural commodities,” and employees employed in such operations are engaged in agriculture. In general, within the meaning of the Act, “agricultural or horticultural commodities” refers to commodities resulting from the application of agricultural or horticultural techniques. Insofar as the term refers to products of the soil, it means commodities that are planted and cultivated by man. Among such commodities are the following: Grains, forage crops, fruits, vegetables, nuts, sugar crops, fiber crops, tobacco, and nursery products. Thus, employees engaged in growing wheat, corn, hay, onions, carrots, sugar cane, seed, or any other agricultural or horticultural commodity are engaged in “agriculture.” In addition to such products of the soil, however, the term includes domesticated animals and some of their products such as milk, wool, eggs, and honey. The term does not include commodities produced by industrial techniques, by exploitation of mineral wealth or other natural resources, or by uncultivated natural growth. For example, peat humus or peat moss is not an agricultural commodity. Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 f(2d) 209 (C.A.4).
Seeds and seedlings of agricultural and horticultural plants are considered “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Thus, since mushrooms and beans are considered “agricultural or horticultural commodities,” the spawn of mushrooms and bean sprouts are also so considered and the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of mushroom spawn or bean sprouts is “agriculture” within the meaning of section 3(f).
Employees engaged in the gathering or harvesting of wild commodities such as mosses, wild rice, burls and laurel plants, the trapping of wild animals, or the appropriation of minerals and other uncultivated products from the soil are not employed in “the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of agricultural or horticultural commodities.” However, the fact that plants or other commodities actually cultivated by men are of a species which ordinarily grows wild without being cultivated does not preclude them from being classed as “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Transplanted branches which were cut from plants growing wild in the field or forest are included within the term. Cultivated blueberries are also included.
Trees grown in forests and the lumber derived therefrom are not “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Christmas trees, whether wild or planted, are also not so considered. It follows that employment in the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of such trees or timber products is not sufficient to bring an employee within section 3(f) unless the operation is performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with his or its farming operations. On the latter point, see §§ 780.160 through 780.164 which discuss the question of when forestry or lumbering operations are incident to or in conjunction with farming operations so as to constitute “agriculture.” For a discussion of the exemption in section 13(a)(13) of the Act for certain forestry and logging operations in which not more than eight employees are employed, see part 788 of this chapter.
(a) Section 3(f) expressly provides that the term “agricultural or horticultural commodities” shall include the commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1141-1141j). Section 15(g) of that Act provides: “As used in this act, the term ‘agricultural commodity’ includes, in addition to other agricultural commodities, crude gum (oleoresin) from a living tree, and the following products as processed by the original producers of the crude gum (oleoresin) from which derived: Gum spirits of turpentine, and gum resin, as defined in the Naval Stores Act, approved March 3, 1923” (7 U.S.C. 91-99). As defined in the Naval Stores Act, “ ‘gum spirits of turpentine’ means spirits of turpentine made from gum (oleoresin) from a living tree” and “ ‘gum rosin’ means rosin remaining after the distillation of gum spirits of turpentine.” The production of these commodities is therefore within the definition of “agriculture.”
(b) Since the only oleoresin included within section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act is that derived from a living tree, the production of oleoresin from stumps or any sources other than living trees is not within section 3(f). If turpentine or rosin is produced in any manner other than the processing of crude gum from living trees, as by digging up pine stumps and grinding them or by distilling the turpentine with steam from the oleoresin within or extracted from the wood, the production of the turpentine or rosin is not included in section 3(f).
(c) Similarly, the production of gum turpentine or gum rosin is not included when these are produced by anyone other than the original producer of the crude gum from which they are derived. Thus, if a producer of turpentine or rosin from oleoresin from living trees makes such products not only from oleoresin produced by him but also from oleoresin delivered to him by others, he is not producing a product defined as an agricultural commodity and employees engaged in his production operations are not agricultural employees. (For an explanation of the inclusion of the word “production” in section 3(f), see § 780.117(b).) It is to be noted, however, that the production of gum turpentine and gum rosin from crude gum (oleoresin) derived from a living tree is included within section 3(f) when performed at a central still for and on account of the producer of the crude gum. But where central stills buy the crude gum they process and are the owners of the gum turpentine and gum rosin that are derived from such crude gum and which they market for their own account, the production of such gum turpentine and gum rosin is not within section 3(f).
(a) The words “production, cultivation, growing” describe actual raising operations which are normally intended or expected to produce specific agricultural or horticultural commodities. The raising of such commodities is included even though done for purely experimental purposes. The “growing” may take place in growing media other than soil as in the case of hydroponics. The words do not include operations undertaken or conducted for purposes not concerned with obtaining any specific agricultural or horticultural commodity. Thus operations which are merely preliminary, preparatory or incidental to the operations whereby such commodities are actually produced are not within the terms “production, cultivation, growing”. For example, employees of a processor of vegetables who are engaged in buying vegetable plants and distributing them to farmers with whom their employer has acreage contracts are not engaged in the “production, cultivation, growing” of agricultural or horticultural commodities. The furnishing of mushroom spawn by a canner of mushrooms to growers who supply the canner with mushrooms grown from such spawn does not constitute the “growing” of mushrooms. Similarly, employees of the employer who is engaged in servicing insecticide sprayers in the farmer's orchard and employees engaged in such operations as the testing of soil or genetics research are not included within the terms. (However, see §§ 780.128, et seq., for possible exemption on other grounds.) The word “production,” used in conjunction with “cultivation, growing, and harvesting,” refers, in its natural and unstrained meaning, to what is derived and produced from the soil, such as any farm produce. Thus, “production” as used in section 3(f) does not refer to such operations as the grinding and processing of sugarcane, the milling of wheat into flour, or the making of cider from apples. These operations are clearly the processing of the agricultural commodities and not the production of them ( Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11).
(b) The word “production” was added to the definition of “agriculture” in order to take care of a special situation—the production of turpentine and gum rosins by a process involving the tapping of living trees. (See S. Rep. No. 230, 71st Cong., second sess. (1930); H.R. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong., third sess. p. 29 (1938).) To insure the inclusion of this process within the definition, the word “production” was added to section 3(f) in conjunction with the words “including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended” ( Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11). It is clear, therefore, that “production” is not used in section 3(f) in the artificial and special sense in which it is defined in section 3(j). It does not exempt an employee merely because he is engaged in a closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production of agricultural or horticultural commodities. To so construe the term would render unnecessary the remainder of what Congress clearly intended to be a very elaborate and comprehensive definition of “agriculture.” The legislative history of this part of the definition was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in reaching these conclusions in Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.
(a) The term “Harvesting” as used in section 3(f) includes all operations customarily performed in connection with the removal of the crops by the farmer from their growing position ( Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714). Examples include the cutting of grain, the picking of fruit, the stripping of bluegrass seed, and the digging up of shrubs and trees grown in a nursery. Employees engaged on a plantation in gathering sugarcane as soon as it has been cut, loading it, and transporting the cane to a concentration point on the farm are engaged in “Harvesting” ( Vives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552).
(b) The combining of grain is exempt either as harvesting or as a practice performed on a farm in conjunction with or as an incident to farming operations. (See in this connection Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398.) “Harvesting” does not extend to operations subsequent to and unconnected with the actual process whereby agricultural or horticultural commodities are severed from their attachment to the soil or otherwise reduced to possession. For example, the processing of sugarcane into raw sugar ( Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11, and see Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254), or the vining of peas are not included. For a further discussion on vining employees, see § 780.139. While transportation to a concentration point on the farm may be included, “harvesting” never extends to transportation or other operations off the farm. Off-the-farm transportation can only be “agriculture” when performed by the farmer as an incident to his farming operations ( Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897). For further discussion of this point, see §§ 780.144 through 780.147; §§ 780.152 through 780.157.
Employees are employed in the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals or poultry only if their operations relate to animals of the type named and constitute the “raising” of such animals. If these two requirements are met, it makes no difference for what purpose the animals are raised or where the operations are performed. For example, the fact that cattle are raised to obtain serum or virus or that chicks are hatched in a commercial hatchery does not affect the status of the operations under section 3(f).
The meaning of the term “livestock” as used in section 3(f) is confined to the ordinary use of the word and includes only domestic animals ordinarily raised or used on farms. That Congress did not use this term in its generic sense is supported by the specific enumeration of activities, such as the raising of fur-bearing animals, which would be included in the generic meaning of the word. The term includes the following animals, among others: Cattle (both dairy and beef cattle), sheep, swine, horses, mules, donkeys, and goats. It does not include such animals as albino and other rats, mice, guinea pigs, and hamsters, which are ordinarily used by laboratories for research purposes ( Mitchell v. Maxfield, 12 WH Cases 792 (S.D. Ohio), 29 Labor Cases 68, 781). Fish are not “livestock” ( Dunkly v. Erich, 158 F. 2d 1), but employees employed in propagating or farming of fish may qualify for exemption under section 13(a)(6) or 13(b)(12) of the Act as stated in § 780.109 as well as under section 13(a)(5), as explained in part 784 of this chapter.
The term “raising” employed with reference to livestock in section 3(f) includes such operations as the breeding, fattening, feeding, and general care of livestock. Thus, employees exclusively engaged in feeding and fattening livestock in stock pens where the livestock remains for a substantial period of time are engaged in the “raising” of livestock. The fact that the livestock is purchased to be fattened and is not bred on the premises does not characterize the fattening as something other than the “raising” of livestock. The feeding and care of livestock does not necessarily or under all circumstances constitute the “raising” of such livestock, however. It is clear, for example, that animals are not being “raised” in the pens of stockyards or the corrals of meat packing plants where they are confined for a period of a few days while en route to slaughter or pending their sale or shipment. Therefore, employees employed in these places in feeding and caring for the constantly changing group of animals cannot reasonably be regarded as “raising” livestock ( NLRB v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. 2d 626, cert. denied 311 U.S. 668; Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429). Employees of a cattle raisers' association engaged in the publication of a magazine about cattle, the detection of cattle thefts, the location of stolen cattle, and apprehension of cattle thieves are not employed in raising livestock and are not engaged in agriculture.
Employees engaged in the breeding, raising, and training of horses on farms for racing purposes are considered agricultural employees. Included are such employees as grooms, attendants, exercise boys, and watchmen employed at the breeding or training farm. On the other hand, employees engaged in the racing, training, and care of horses and other activities performed off the farm in connection with commercial racing are not employed in agriculture. For this purpose, a training track at a racetrack is not a farm. Where a farmer is engaged in both the raising and commercial racing of race horses, the activities performed off the farm by his employees as an incident to racing, such as the training and care of the horses, are not practices performed by the farmer in his capacity as a farmer or breeder as an incident to his raising operations. Employees engaged in the feeding, care, and training of horses which have been used in commercial racing and returned to a breeding or training farm for such care pending entry in subsequent races are employed in agriculture.
The term “raising of * * * bees” refers to all of those activities customarily performed in connection with the handling and keeping of bees, including the treatment of disease and the raising of queens.
(a) The term “fur-bearing animals” has reference to animals which bear fur of marketable value and includes, among other animals, rabbits, silver foxes, minks, squirrels, and muskrats. Animals whose fur lacks marketable value, such as albino and other rats, mice, guinea pigs, and hamsters, are not “fur-bearing animals” which within the meaning of section 3(f).
(b) The term “raising” of fur-bearing animals includes all those activities customarily performed in connection with breeding, feeding and caring for fur-bearing animals, including the treatment of disease. Such treatment of disease has reference only to disease of the animals being bred and does not refer to the use of such animals or their fur in experimenting with disease or treating diseases in others. The fact that muskrats or other fur-bearing animals are propagated in open water or marsh areas rather than in pens does not prevent the raising of such animals from constituting the “raising of fur-bearing animals.” Where wild fur-bearing animals propagate in their native habitat and are not raised as above described, the trapping or hunting of such animals and activities incidental thereto are not included within section 3(f).
(a) The term “poultry” includes domesticated fowl and game birds. Ducks and pigeons are included. Canaries and parakeets are not included.
(b) The “raising” of poultry includes the breeding, hatching, propagating, feeding, and general care of poultry. Slaughtering, which is the antithesis of “raising,” is not included. To constitute “agriculture,” slaughtering must come within the secondary meaning of the term “agriculture.” The temporary feeding and care of chickens and other poultry for a few days pending sale, shipment or slaughter is not the “raising” of poultry. However, feeding, fattening and caring for poultry over a substantial period may constitute the “raising” of poultry.
Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not “raising of poultry” and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in “secondary” agriculture (see §§ 780.137 et seq. and Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244 F. 2d 553).
Hatchery operations incident to the breeding of poultry, whether performed in a rural or urban location, are the “raising of poultry” ( Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer, 131 F. 2d 283). The application of section 3(f) to employees of hatcheries is further discussed in §§ 780.210 through 780.214.
The discussion in §§ 780.106 through 780.127 relates to the direct farming operations which come within the “primary” meaning of the definition of “agriculture.” As defined in section 3(f) “agriculture” includes not only the farming activities described in the “primary” meaning but also includes, in its “secondary” meaning, “any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.” The legislative history makes it plain that this language was particularly included to make certain that independent contractors such as threshers of wheat, who travel around from farm to farm to assist farmers in what is recognized as a purely agricultural task and also to assist a farmer in getting his agricultural goods to market in their raw or natural state, should be included within the definition of agricultural employees (see Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11; 81 Cong. Rec. 7876, 7888).
To come within this secondary meaning, a practice must be performed either by a farmer or on a farm. It must also be performed either in connection with the farmer's own farming operations or in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where the practice is performed. In addition, the practice must be performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” the farming operations. No matter how closely related it may be to farming operations, a practice performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not within the scope of the “secondary” meaning of “agriculture.” Thus, employees employed by commission brokers in the typical activities conducted at their establishments, warehouse employees at the typical tobacco warehouses, shop employees of an employer engaged in the business of servicing machinery and equipment for farmers, plant employees of a company dealing in eggs or poultry produced by others, employees of an irrigation company engaged in the general distribution of water to farmers, and other employees similarly situated do not generally come within the secondary meaning of “agriculture.” The inclusion of industrial operations is not within the intent of the definition in section 3(f), nor are processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture (see Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473).
Among other things, a practice must be performed by a farmer or on a farm in order to come within the secondary portion of the definition of “agriculture.” No precise lines can be drawn which will serve to delimit the term “farmer” in all cases. Essentially, however, the term is an occupational title and the employer must be engaged in activities of a type and to the extent that the person ordinarily regarded as a “farmer” is engaged in order to qualify for the title. If this test is met, it is immaterial for what purpose he engages in farming or whether farming is his sole occupation. Thus, an employer's status as a “farmer” is not altered by the fact that his only purpose is to obtain products useful to him in a non-farming enterprise which he conducts. For example, an employer engaged in raising nursery stock is a “farmer” for purposes of section 3(f) even though his purpose is to supply goods for a separate establishment where he engages in the retail distribution of nursery products. The term “farmer” as used in section 3(f) is not confined to individual persons. Thus an association, a partnership, or a corporation which engages in actual farming operations may be a “farmer” (see Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473). This is so even where it operates “what might be called the agricultural analogue of the modern industrial assembly line” ( Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).
Generally, an employer must undertake farming operations of such scope and significance as to constitute a distinct activity, for the purpose of yielding a farm product, in order to be regarded as a “farmer.” It does not necessarily follow, however, that any employer is a “farmer” simply because he engages in some actual farming operations of the type specified in section 3(f). Thus, one who merely harvests a crop of agricultural commodities is not a “farmer” although his employees who actually do the harvesting are employed in “agriculture” in those weeks when exclusively so engaged. As a general rule, a farmer performs his farming operations on land owned, leased, or controlled by him and devoted to his own use. The mere fact, therefore, that an employer harvests a growing crop, even under a partnership agreement pursuant to which he provides credit, advisory or other services, is not generally considered to be sufficient to qualify the employer so engaged as a “farmer.” Such an employer would stand, in packing or handling the product, in the same relationship to the produce as if it were from the fields or groves of an independent grower. One who engaged merely in practices which are incidental to farming is not a “farmer.” For example, a company which merely prepares for market, sells, and ships flowers and plants grown and cultivated on farms by affiliated corporations is not a “farmer.” The fact that one has suspended actual farming operations during a period in which he performs only practices incidental to his part or prospective farming operations does not, however, preclude him from qualifying as a “farmer.” One otherwise qualified as a farmer does not lose his status as such because he performs farming operations on land which he does not own or control, as in the case of a cattleman using public lands for grazing.
“Farmer” includes the employees of a farmer. It does not include an employer merely because he employs a farmer or appoints a farmer as his agent to do the actual work. Thus, the stripping of tobacco, i.e., removing leaves from the stalk, by the employees of an independent warehouse is not a practice performed “by a farmer” even though the warehouse acts as agent for the tobacco farmer or employs the farmer in the stripping operations. One who merely performs services or supplies materials for farmers in return for compensation in money or farm products is not a “farmer.” Thus, a person who provides credit and management services to farmers cannot qualify as a “farmer” on that account. Neither can a repairman who repairs and services farm machinery qualify as a “farmer” on that basis. Where crops are grown under contract with a person who provides a market, contributes counsel and advice, make advances and otherwise assists the grower who actually produces the crop, it is the grower and not the person with whom he contracts who is the farmer with respect to that crop ( Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286).
(a) The phrase “by a farmer” covers practices performed either by the farmer himself or by the farmer through his employees. Employees of a farmers' cooperative association, however, are employed not by the individual farmers who compose its membership or who are its stockholders, but by the cooperative association itself. Cooperative associations whether in the corporate form or not, are distinct, separate entities from the farmers who own or compose them. The work performed by a farmers' cooperative association is not work performed “by a farmer” but for farmers. Therefore, employees of a farmers' cooperative association are not generally engaged in any practices performed “by a farmer” within the meaning of section 3(f) ( Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Goldberg v. Crowley Ridge Ass'n., 295 F. 2d 7; McComb v. Puerto Rico Tobacco Marketing Co-op Ass'n., 80 F. Supp. 953, 181 F. 2d 697). The legislative history of the Act supports this interpretation. Statutes usually cite farmers' cooperative associations in express terms if it is intended that they be included. The omission of express language from the Fair Labor Standards Act is significant since many unsuccessful attempts were made on the floor of Congress to secure special treatment for such cooperatives.
(b) It is possible that some farmers' cooperative associations may themselves engage in actual farming operations to an extent and under circumstances sufficient to qualify as a “farmer.” In such case, any of their employees who perform practices as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations are employed in “agriculture.”
If a practice is not performed by a farmer, it must, among other things, be performed “on a farm” to come within the secondary meaning of “agriculture” in section 3(f). Any practice which cannot be performed on a farm, such as “delivery to market,” is necessarily excluded, therefore, when performed by someone other than a farmer (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897). Thus, employees of an alfalfa dehydrator engaged in hauling chopped or unchopped alfalfa away from the farms to the dehydrating plant are not employed in a practice performed “on a farm.”
A “farm” is a tract of land devoted to the actual farming activities included in the first part of section 3(f). Thus, the gathering of wild plants in the woods for transplantation in a nursery is not an operation performed “on a farm.” (For a further discussion, see § 780.207.) The total area of a tract operated as a unit for farming purposes is included in the “farm,” irrespective of the fact that some of this area may not be utilized for actual farming operations (see NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; In re Princeville Canning Co., 14 WH Cases 641 and 762). It is immaterial whether a farm is situated in the city or in the country. However, a place in a city where no primary farming operations are performed is not a farm even if operated by a farmer ( Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286).
Employees engaged in building terraces or threshing wheat and other grain, employees engaged in the erection of silos and granaries, employees engaged in digging wells or building dams for farm ponds, employees engaged in inspecting and culling flocks of poultry, and pilots and flagmen engaged in the aerial dusting and spraying of crops are examples of the types of employees of independent contractors who may be considered employed in practices performed “on a farm.” Whether such employees are engaged in “agriculture” depends, of course, on whether the practices are performed as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations on the particular farm, as discussed in §§ 780.141 through 780.147; that is, whether they are carried on as a part of the agricultural function or as a separately organized productive activity (§§ 780.104 through 780.144). Even though an employee may work on several farms during a workweek, he is regarded as employed “on a farm” for the entire workweek if his work on each farm pertains solely to farming operations on that farm. The fact that a minor and incidental part of the work of such an employee occurs off the farm will not affect this conclusion. Thus, an employee may spend a small amount of time within the workweek in transporting necessary equipment for work to be done on farms. Field employees of a canner or processor of farm products who work on farms during the planting and growing season where they supervise the planting operations and consult with the grower on problems of cultivation are employed in practices performed “on a farm” so long as such work is done entirely on farms save for an incidental amount of reporting to their employer's plant. Other employees of the above employers employed away from the farm would not come within section 3(f). For example, airport employees such as mechanics, loaders, and office workers employed by a crop dusting firm would not be agriculture employees ( Wirtz v. Boyls dba Boyls Dusting and Spraying Service 230 F. Supp. 246, aff'd per curiam 352 F. 2d 63; Tobin v. Wenatchee Air Service, 10 WH Cases 680, 21 CCH Lab Cas. Paragraph 67,019 (E.D. Wash.)).
Cite this law
EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (U.S.C.). Retrieved via LawPlayer, https://lawplayer.com/us/act/cfr-title-29-part-780
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