TYPES OF CONTRACTS

• Citation: 48 CFR Part 16
• Sections: 66

§ 16.001 16.001 Definitions.

As used in this part—

Award-Fee Board means the team of individuals identified in the award-fee plan who have been designated to assist the Fee-Determining Official in making award-fee determinations.

Established price means a price that—

(1) Is an established catalog or market price for a commercial product sold in substantial quantities to the general public; and

(2) Is the net price after applying any standard trade discounts offered by the contractor.

Fee-Determining Official (FDO) means the designated Agency official(s) who reviews the recommendations of the Award-Fee Board in determining the amount of award fee to be earned by the contractor for each evaluation period.

Rollover of unearned award fee means the process of transferring unearned award fee, which the contractor had an opportunity to earn, from one evaluation period to a subsequent evaluation period, thus allowing the contractor an additional opportunity to earn that previously unearned award fee.

§ 16.000 16.000 Scope of part.

This part describes types of contracts that may be used in acquisitions. It prescribes policies and procedures and provides guidance for selecting a contract type appropriate to the circumstances of the acquisition.

§ 16.101 16.101 General.

(a) A wide selection of contract types is available to the Government and contractors in order to provide needed flexibility in acquiring the large variety and volume of supplies and services required by agencies. Contract types vary according to (1) the degree and timing of the responsibility assumed by the contractor for the costs of performance and (2) the amount and nature of the profit incentive offered to the contractor for achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals.

(b) The contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts (see subpart 16.2) and cost-reimbursement contracts (see subpart 16.3). The specific contract types range from firm-fixed-price, in which the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), to cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal responsibility for the performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed. In between are the various incentive contracts (see subpart 16.4), in which the contractor's responsibility for the performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are tailored to the uncertainties involved in contract performance.

§ 16.102 16.102 Policies.

(a) Contracts resulting from sealed bidding shall be firm-fixed-price contracts or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment.

(b) Contracts negotiated under part 15 may be of any type or combination of types that will promote the Government's interest, except as restricted in this part (see 10 U.S.C. 3321(a) and 41 U.S.C. 3901). Contract types not described in this regulation shall not be used, except as a deviation under subpart 1.4.

(c) The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting shall not be used (see 10 U.S.C. 3322(a) and 41 U.S.C. 3905(a)). Prime contracts (including letter contracts) other than firm-fixed-price contracts shall, by an appropriate clause, prohibit cost- plus-a-percentage-of-cost subcontracts (see clauses prescribed in subpart 44.2 for cost-reimbursement contracts and subparts 16.2 and 16.4 for fixed-price contracts).

(d) No contract may be awarded before the execution of any determination and findings (D&F's) required by this part. Minimum requirements for the content of D&F's required by this part are specified in 1.704.

§ 16.103 16.103 Negotiating contract type.

(a) Selecting the contract type is generally a matter for negotiation and requires the exercise of sound judgment. Negotiating the contract type and negotiating prices are closely related and should be considered together. The objective is to negotiate a contract type and price (or estimated cost and fee) that will result in reasonable contractor risk and provide the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance.

(b) A firm-fixed-price contract, which best utilizes the basic profit motive of business enterprise, shall be used when the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty. However, when a reasonable basis for firm pricing does not exist, other contract types should be considered, and negotiations should be directed toward selecting a contract type (or combination of types) that will appropriately tie profit to contractor performance.

(c) In the course of an acquisition program, a series of contracts, or a single long-term contract, changing circumstances may make a different contract type appropriate in later periods than that used at the outset. In particular, contracting officers should avoid protracted use of a cost-reimbursement or time-and-materials contract after experience provides a basis for firmer pricing.

(d)(1) Each contract file shall include documentation to show why the particular contract type was selected. This shall be documented in the acquisition plan, or in the contract file if a written acquisition plan is not required by agency procedures.

(i) Explain why the contract type selected must be used to meet the agency need.

(ii) Discuss the Government's additional risks and the burden to manage the contract type selected ( e.g., when a cost-reimbursement contract is selected, the Government incurs additional cost risks, and the Government has the additional burden of managing the contractor's costs). For such instances, acquisition personnel shall discuss—

(A) How the Government identified the additional risks ( e.g., pre-award survey, or past performance information);

(B) The nature of the additional risks ( e.g., inadequate contractor's accounting system, weaknesses in contractor's internal control, non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards, or lack of or inadequate earned value management system); and

(C) How the Government will manage and mitigate the risks.

(iii) Discuss the Government resources necessary to properly plan for, award, and administer the contract type selected ( e.g., resources needed and the additional risks to the Government if adequate resources are not provided).

(iv) For other than a firm-fixed price contract, at a minimum the documentation should include—

(A) An analysis of why the use of other than a firm-fixed-price contract ( e.g., cost reimbursement, time and materials, labor hour) is appropriate;

(B) Rationale that detail the particular facts and circumstances ( e.g., complexity of the requirements, uncertain duration of the work, contractor's technical capability and financial responsibility, or adequacy of the contractor's accounting system), and associated reasoning essential to support the contract type selection;

(C) An assessment regarding the adequacy of Government resources that are necessary to properly plan for, award, and administer other than firm-fixed-price contracts; and

(D) A discussion of the actions planned to minimize the use of other than firm-fixed-price contracts on future acquisitions for the same requirement and to transition to firm-fixed-price contracts to the maximum extent practicable.

(v) A discussion of why a level-of-effort, price redetermination, or fee provision was included.

(2) Exceptions to the requirements at (d)(1) of this section are—

(i) Fixed-price acquisitions made under simplified acquisition procedures;

(ii) Contracts on a firm-fixed-price basis other than those for major systems or research and development; and

(iii) Awards on the set-aside portion of sealed bid partial set-asides for small business.

§ 16.104 16.104 Factors in selecting contract types.

There are many factors that the contracting officer should consider in selecting and negotiating the contract type. They include the following:

(a) Price competition. Normally, effective price competition results in realistic pricing, and a fixed-price contract is ordinarily in the Government's interest.

(b) Price analysis. Price analysis with or without competition, may provide a basis for selecting the contract type. The degree to which price analysis can provide a realistic pricing standard should be carefully considered. (See 15.404-1(b).)

(c) Cost analysis. In the absence of effective price competition and if price analysis is not sufficient, the cost estimates of the offeror and the Government provide the bases for negotiating contract pricing arrangements. It is essential that the uncertainties involved in performance and their possible impact upon costs be identified and evaluated, so that a contract type that places a reasonable degree of cost responsibility upon the contractor can be negotiated.

(d) Type and complexity of the requirement. Complex requirements, particularly those unique to the Government, usually result in greater risk assumption by the Government. This is especially true for complex research and development contracts, when performance uncertainties or the likelihood of changes makes it difficult to estimate performance costs in advance. As a requirement recurs or as quantity production begins, the cost risk should shift to the contractor, and a fixed-price contract should be considered.

(e) Combining contract types. If the entire contract cannot be firm-fixed-price, the contracting officer shall consider whether or not a portion of the contract can be established on a firm-fixed-price basis.

(f) Urgency of the requirement. If urgency is a primary factor, the Government may choose to assume a greater proportion of risk or it may offer incentives tailored to performance outcomes to ensure timely contract performance.

(g) Period of performance or length of production run. In times of economic uncertainty, contracts extending over a relatively long period may require economic price adjustment or price redetermination clauses.

(h) Contractor's technical capability and financial responsibility.

(i) Adequacy of the contractor's accounting system. Before agreeing on a contract type other than firm-fixed-price, the contracting officer shall ensure that the contractor's accounting system will permit timely development of all necessary cost data in the form required by the proposed contract type. This factor may be critical—

(1) When the contract type requires price revision while performance is in progress; or

(2) When a cost-reimbursement contract is being considered and all current or past experience with the contractor has been on a fixed-price basis. See 42.302(a)(12).

(j) Concurrent contracts. If performance under the proposed contract involves concurrent operations under other contracts, the impact of those contracts, including their pricing arrangements, should be considered.

(k) Extent and nature of proposed subcontracting. If the contractor proposes extensive subcontracting, a contract type reflecting the actual risks to the prime contractor should be selected.

(l) Acquisition history. Contractor risk usually decreases as the requirement is repetitively acquired. Also, product descriptions or descriptions of services to be performed can be defined more clearly.

§ 16.105 16.105 Solicitation provision.

The contracting officer shall complete and insert the provision at 52.216-1, Type of Contract, in a solicitation unless it is for—

(a) A fixed-price acquisition made under simplified acquisition procedures; or

(b) Information or planning purposes.

§ 16.201 16.201 General.

(a) Fixed-price types of contracts provide for a firm price or, in appropriate cases, an adjustable price. Fixed-price contracts providing for an adjustable price may include a ceiling price, a target price (including target cost), or both. Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the ceiling price or target price is subject to adjustment only by operation of contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances. The contracting officer shall use firm-fixed-price or fixed-price with economic price adjustment contracts when acquiring commercial products and commercial services, except as provided in 12.207(b).

(b) Time-and-materials contracts and labor-hour contracts are not fixed-price contracts.

§ 16.202-1 16.202-1 Description.

A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties. The contracting officer may use a firm-fixed-price contract in conjunction with an award-fee incentive (see 16.404) and performance or delivery incentives (see 16.402-2 and 16.402-3) when the award fee or incentive is based solely on factors other than cost. The contract type remains firm-fixed-price when used with these incentives.

§ 16.202-2 16.202-2 Application.

A firm-fixed-price contract is suitable for acquiring commercial products or commercial services (see parts 2 and 12) or for acquiring other supplies or services on the basis of reasonably definite functional or detailed specifications (see part 11) when the contracting officer can establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset, such as when—

(a) There is adequate price competition;

(b) There are reasonable price comparisons with prior purchases of the same or similar supplies or services made on a competitive basis or supported by valid certified cost or pricing data;

(c) Available cost or pricing information permits realistic estimates of the probable costs of performance; or

(d) Performance uncertainties can be identified and reasonable estimates of their cost impact can be made, and the contractor is willing to accept a firm fixed price representing assumption of the risks involved.

§ 16.203-1 16.203-1 Description.

(a) A fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment provides for upward and downward revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies. Economic price adjustments are of three general types:

(1) Adjustments based on established prices. These price adjustments are based on increases or decreases from an agreed-upon level in published or otherwise established prices of specific items or the contract end items.

(2) Adjustments based on actual costs of labor or material. These price adjustments are based on increases or decreases in specified costs of labor or material that the contractor actually experiences during contract performance.

(3) Adjustments based on cost indexes of labor or material. These price adjustments are based on increases or decreases in labor or material cost standards or indexes that are specifically identified in the contract.

(b) The contracting officer may use a fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment in conjunction with an award-fee incentive (see 16.404) and performance or delivery incentives (see 16.402-2 and 16.402-3) when the award fee or incentive is based solely on factors other than cost. The contract type remains fixed-price with economic price adjustment when used with these incentives.

§ 16.203-2 16.203-2 Application.

A fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment may be used when (i) there is serious doubt concerning the stability of market or labor conditions that will exist during an extended period of contract performance, and (ii) contingencies that would otherwise be included in the contract price can be identified and covered separately in the contract. Price adjustments based on established prices should normally be restricted to industry-wide contingencies. Price adjustments based on labor and material costs should be limited to contingencies beyond the contractor's control. For use of economic price adjustment in sealed bid contracts, see 14.408-4.

(a) In establishing the base level from which adjustment will be made, the contracting officer shall ensure that contingency allowances are not duplicated by inclusion in both the base price and the adjustment requested by the contractor under economic price adjustment clause.

(b) In contracts that do not require submission of certified cost or pricing data, the contracting officer shall obtain adequate data to establish the base level from which adjustment will be made and may require verification of data submitted.

§ 16.203-3 16.203-3 Limitations.

A fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment shall not be used unless the contracting officer determines that it is necessary either to protect the contractor and the Government against significant fluctuations in labor or material costs or to provide for contract price adjustment in the event of changes in the contractor's established prices.

§ 16.203-4 16.203-4 Contract clauses.

(a) Adjustment based on established prices—standard supplies. (1) The contracting officer shall, when contracting by negotiation, insert the clause at 52.216-2, Economic Price Adjustment—Standard Supplies, or an agency-prescribed clause as authorized in subparagraph (2) below, in solicitations and contracts when all of the following conditions apply:

(i) A fixed-price contract is contemplated.

(ii) The requirement is for standard supplies that have an established catalog or market price.

(iii) The contracting officer has made the determination specified in 16.203-3.

(2) If all the conditions in subparagraph (a)(1) above apply and the contracting officer determines that the use of the clause at 52.216-2 is inappropriate, the contracting officer may use an agency-prescribed clause instead of the clause at 52.216-2.

(3) If the negotiated unit price reflects a net price after applying a trade discount from a catalog or list price, the contracting officer shall document in the contract file both the catalog or list price and the discount. (This does not apply to prompt payment or cash discounts.)

(4) The contracting officer may modify the clause by increasing the 10 percent limit on aggregate increases specified in 52.216-2(c)(1), upon approval by the chief of the contracting office.

(b) Adjustment based on established prices—semistandard supplies. (1) The contracting officer shall, when contracting by negotiation, insert the clause at 52.216-3, Economic Price Adjustment—Semistandard Supplies, or an agency-prescribed clause as authorized in subparagraph (2) below, in solicitations and contracts when all of the following conditions apply:

(i) A fixed price contract is contemplated.

(ii) The requirement is for semistandard supplies for which the prices can be reasonably related to the prices of nearly equivalent standard supplies that have an established catalog or market price.

(iii) The contracting officer has made the determination specified in 16.203-3.

(2) If all conditions in subparagraph (b)(1) above apply and the contracting officer determines that the use of the clause at 52.216-3 is inappropriate, the contracting officer may use an agency-prescribed clause instead of the clause at 52.216-3.

(3) If the negotiated unit price reflects a net price after applying a trade discount from a catalog or list price, the contracting officer shall document in the contract file both the catalog or list price and the discount. (This does not apply to prompt payment or cash discounts.)

(4) Before entering into the contract, the contracting officer and contractor must agree in writing on the identity of the standard supplies and the corresponding line items to which the clause applies.

(5) If the supplies are standard, except for preservation, packaging, and packing requirements, the clause prescribed in 16.203-4(a), shall be used rather than this clause.

(6) The contracting officer may modify the clause by increasing the 10 percent limit on aggregate increases specified in 52.216-3(c)(1), upon approval by the chief of the contracting office.

(c) Adjustments based on actual cost of labor or material. (1) The contracting officer shall, when contracting by negotiation, insert a clause that is substantially the same as the clause at 52.216-4, Economic Price Adjustment—Labor and Material, or an agency-prescribed clause as authorized in subparagraph (2) below, in solicitation and contracts when all of the following conditions apply:

(i) A fixed-price contract is contemplated.

(ii) There is no major element of design engineering or development work involved.

(iii) One or more identifiable labor or material cost factors are subject to change.

(iv) The contracting officer has made the determination specified in 16.203-3.

(2) If all conditions in subparagraph (c)(1) above apply and the contracting officer determines that the use of the clause at 52.216-4 is inappropriate, the contracting officer may use an agency-prescribed clause instead of the clause at 52.216-4.

(3) The contracting officer shall describe in detail in the contract Schedule—

(i) The types of labor and materials subject to adjustment under the clause;

(ii) The labor rates, including fringe benefits (if any) and unit prices of materials that may be increased or decreased; and

(iii) The quantities of the specified labor and materials allocable to each unit to be delivered under the contract.

(4) In negotiating adjustments under the clause, the contracting officer shall—

(i) Consider work in process and materials on hand at the time of changes in labor rates, including fringe benefits (if any) or material prices;

(ii) Not include in adjustments any indirect cost (except fringe benefits as defined in 31.205-6(m)) or profit; and

(iii) Consider only those fringe benefits specified in the contract Schedule.

(5) The contracting officer may modify the clause by increasing the 10 percent limit on aggregate increases specified in 52.216-4(c)(4), upon approval by the chief of the contracting office.

(d) Adjustments based on cost indexes of labor or material. The contracting officer should consider using an economic price adjustment clause based on cost indexes of labor or material under the circumstances and subject to approval as described in subparagraphs (1) and (2) below.

(1) A clause providing adjustment based on cost indexes of labor or materials may be appropriate when—

(i) The contract involves an extended period of performance with significant costs to be incurred beyond 1 year after performance begins;

(ii) The contract amount subject to adjustment is substantial; and

(iii) The economic variables for labor and materials are too unstable to permit a reasonable division of risk between the Government and the contractor, without this type of clause.

(2) Any clause using this method shall be prepared and approved under agency procedures. Because of the variations in circumstances and clause wording that may arise, no standard clause is prescribed.

§ 16.204 16.204 Fixed-price incentive contracts.

A fixed-price incentive contract is a fixed-price contract that provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost. Fixed-price incentive contracts are covered in subpart 16.4, Incentive Contracts. See 16.403 for more complete descriptions, application, and limitations for these contracts. Prescribed clauses are found at 16.406.

§ 16.205-1 16.205-1 Description.

A fixed-price contract with prospective price redetermination provides for (a) a firm fixed price for an initial period of contract deliveries or performance and (b) prospective redetermination, at a stated time or times during performance, of the price for subsequent periods of performance.

§ 16.205-2 16.205-2 Application.

A fixed-price contract with prospective price redetermination may be used in acquisitions of quantity production or services for which it is possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable firm fixed price for an initial period, but not for subsequent periods of contract performance.

(a) The initial period should be the longest period for which it is possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable firm fixed price. Each subsequent pricing period should be at least 12 months.

(b) The contract may provide for a ceiling price based on evaluation of the uncertainties involved in performance and their possible cost impact. This ceiling price should provide for assumption of a reasonable proportion of the risk by the contractor and, once established, may be adjusted only by operation of contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances.

§ 16.205-3 16.205-3 Limitations.

This contract type shall not be used unless—

(a) Negotiations have established that (1) the conditions for use of a firm-fixed-price contract are not present (see 16.202-2), and (2) a fixed-price incentive contract would not be more appropriate;

(b) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for price redetermination;

(c) The prospective pricing periods can be made to conform with operation of the contractor's accounting system; and

(d) There is reasonable assurance that price redetermination actions will take place promptly at the specified times.

§ 16.205-4 16.205-4 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall, when contracting by negotiation, insert the clause at 52.216-5, Price Redetermination—Prospective, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price contract is contemplated and the conditions specified in 16.205-2 and 16.205-3(a) through (d) apply.

§ 16.206-1 16.206-1 Description.

A fixed-ceiling-price contract with retroactive price redetermination provides for (a) a fixed ceiling price and (b) retroactive price redetermination within the ceiling after completion of the contract.

§ 16.206-2 16.206-2 Application.

A fixed-ceiling-price contract with retroactive price redetermination is appropriate for research and development contracts estimated at the simplified acquisition threshold or less when it is established at the outset that a fair and reasonable firm fixed price cannot be negotiated and that the amount involved and short performance period make the use of any other fixed-price contract type impracticable.

(a) A ceiling price shall be negotiated for the contract at a level that reflects a reasonable sharing of risk by the contractor. The established ceiling price may be adjusted only if required by the operation of contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances.

(b) The contract should be awarded only after negotiation of a billing price that is as fair and reasonable as the circumstances permit.

(c) Since this contract type provides the contractor no cost control incentive except the ceiling price, the contracting officer should make clear to the contractor during discussion before award that the contractor's management effectiveness and ingenuity will be considered in retroactively redetermining the price.

§ 16.206-3 16.206-3 Limitations.

This contract type shall not be used unless—

(a) The contract is for research and development and the estimated cost is the simplified acquisition threshold or less;

(b) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for price redetermination;

(c) There is reasonable assurance that the price redetermination will take place promptly at the specified time; and

(d) The head of the contracting activity (or a higher-level official, if required by agency procedures) approves its use in writing.

§ 16.206-4 16.206-4 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall, when contracting by negotiation, insert the clause at 52.216-6, Price Redetermination—Retroactive, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price contract is contemplated and the conditions in 16.206-2 and 16.206-3(a) through (d) apply.

§ 16.207-1 16.207-1 Description.

A firm-fixed-price, level-of-effort term contract requires (a) the contractor to provide a specified level of effort, over a stated period of time, on work that can be stated only in general terms and (b) the Government to pay the contractor a fixed dollar amount.

§ 16.207-2 16.207-2 Application.

A firm-fixed-price, level-of-effort term contract is suitable for investigation or study in a specific research and development area. The product of the contract is usually a report showing the results achieved through application of the required level of effort. However, payment is based on the effort expended rather than on the results achieved.

§ 16.207-3 16.207-3 Limitations.

This contract type may be used only when—

(a) The work required cannot otherwise be clearly defined;

(b) The required level of effort is identified and agreed upon in advance;

(c) There is reasonable assurance that the intended result cannot be achieved by expending less than the stipulated effort; and

(d) The contract price is the simplified acquisition threshold or less, unless approved by the chief of the contracting office.

§ 16.301-1 16.301-1 Description.

Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the approval of the contracting officer.

§ 16.301-2 16.301-2 Application.

(a) The contracting officer shall use cost-reimbursement contracts only when—

(1) Circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract ( see 7.105); or

(2) Uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.

(b) The contracting officer shall document the rationale for selecting the contract type in the written acquisition plan and ensure that the plan is approved and signed at least one level above the contracting officer ( see 7.103(j) and 7.105). See also 16.103(d).

§ 16.301-3 16.301-3 Limitations.

(a) A cost-reimbursement contract may be used only when—

(1) The factors in 16.104 have been considered;

(2) A written acquisition plan has been approved and signed at least one level above the contracting officer;

(3) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract or order; and

(4) Prior to award of the contract or order, adequate Government resources are available to award and manage a contract other than firm-fixed-priced (see 7.104(e)). This includes appropriate Government surveillance during performance in accordance with 1.602-2, to provide reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are used.

(b) The use of cost-reimbursement contracts is prohibited for the acquisition of commercial products and commercial services (see parts 2 and 12).

§ 16.302 16.302 Cost contracts.

(a) Description. A cost contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which the contractor receives no fee.

(b) Application. A cost contract may be appropriate for research and development work, particularly with nonprofit educational institutions or other nonprofit organizations.

(c) Limitations. See 16.301-3.

§ 16.303 16.303 Cost-sharing contracts.

(a) Description. A cost-sharing contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which the contractor receives no fee and is reimbursed only for an agreed-upon portion of its allowable costs.

(b) Application. A cost-sharing contract may be used when the contractor agrees to absorb a portion of the costs, in the expectation of substantial compensating benefits.

(c) Limitations. See 16.301-3.

§ 16.304 16.304 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts are covered in subpart 16.4, Incentive Contracts. See 16.405-1 for a more complete description and discussion of application of these contracts. See 16.301-3 for limitations.

§ 16.305 16.305 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.

A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance. Cost-plus-award-fee contracts are covered in subpart 16.4, Incentive Contracts. See 16.401(e) for a more complete description and discussion of the application of these contracts. See 16.301-3 and 16.401(e)(5) for limitations.

§ 16.306 16.306 Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.

(a) Description. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in the work to be performed under the contract. This contract type permits contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs.

(b) Application. (1) A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is suitable for use when the conditions of 16.301-2 are present and, for example—

(i) The contract is for the performance of research or preliminary exploration or study, and the level of effort required is unknown; or

(ii) The contract is for development and test, and using a cost-plus- incentive-fee contract is not practical.

(2) A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract normally should not be used in development of major systems (see part 34) once preliminary exploration, studies, and risk reduction have indicated a high degree of probability that the development is achievable and the Government has established reasonably firm performance objectives and schedules.

(c) Limitations. No cost-plus-fixed-fee contract shall be awarded unless the contracting officer complies with all limitations in 15.404-4(c)(4)(i) and 16.301-3.

(d) Completion and term forms. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract may take one of two basic forms—completion or term.

(1) The completion form describes the scope of work by stating a definite goal or target and specifying an end product. This form of contract normally requires the contractor to complete and deliver the specified end product (e.g., a final report of research accomplishing the goal or target) within the estimated cost, if possible, as a condition for payment of the entire fixed fee. However, in the event the work cannot be completed within the estimated cost, the Government may require more effort without increase in fee, provided the Government increases the estimated cost.

(2) The term form describes the scope of work in general terms and obligates the contractor to devote a specified level of effort for a stated time period. Under this form, if the performance is considered satisfactory by the Government, the fixed fee is payable at the expiration of the agreed-upon period, upon contractor statement that the level of effort specified in the contract has been expended in performing the contract work. Renewal for further periods of performance is a new acquisition that involves new cost and fee arrangements.

(3) Because of the differences in obligation assumed by the contractor, the completion form is preferred over the term form whenever the work, or specific milestones for the work, can be defined well enough to permit development of estimates within which the contractor can be expected to complete the work.

(4) The term form shall not be used unless the contractor is obligated by the contract to provide a specific level of effort within a definite time period.

§ 16.307 16.307 Contract clauses.

(a)(1) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-reimbursement contract or a time-and-materials contract (other than a contract for a commercial product or commercial service) is contemplated. If the contract is a time-and-materials contract, the clause at 52.216-7 applies in conjunction with the clause at 52.232-7, but only to the portion of the contract that provides for reimbursement of materials (as defined in the clause at 52.232-7) at actual cost. Further, the clause at 52.216-7 does not apply to labor-hour contracts.

(2) If the contract is a construction contract and contains the clause at 52.232-27, Prompt Payment for Construction Contracts, the contracting officer shall use the clause at 52.216-7 with its Alternate I.

(3) If the contract is with an educational institution, the contracting officer shall use the clause at 52.216-7 with its Alternate II.

(4) If the contract is with a State or local government, the contracting officer shall use the clause at 52.216-7 with its Alternate III.

(5) If the contract is with a nonprofit organization other than an educational institution, a State or local government, or a nonprofit organization exempted under the OMB Uniform Guidance at 2 CFR part 200, appendix VIII, the contracting officer shall use the clause at 52.216-7 with its Alternate IV.

(b) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-8, Fixed Fee, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (other than a construction contract) is contemplated.

(c) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-9, Fixed-Fee—Construction, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-plus-fixed-fee construction contract is contemplated.

(d) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-10, Incentive Fee, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is contemplated.

(e)(1) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-11, Cost Contract—No Fee, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-reimbursement contract is contemplated that provides no fee and is not a cost-sharing contract.

(2) If a cost-reimbursement research and development contract with an educational institution or a nonprofit organization that provides no fee or other payment above cost and is not a cost-sharing contract is contemplated, and if the contracting officer determines that withholding of a portion of allowable costs is not required, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I.

(f)(1) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-12, Cost-Sharing Contract—No Fee, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-sharing contract is contemplated.

(2) If a cost-sharing research and development contract with an educational institution or a nonprofit organization is contemplated, and if the contracting officer determines that withholding of a portion of allowable costs is not required, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I.

(g) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.216-15, Predetermined Indirect Cost Rates, in solicitations and contracts when a cost-reimbursement research and development contract with an educational institution (see 42.705-3(b)) is contemplated and predetermined indirect cost rates are to be used.

§ 16.401 16.401 General.

(a) Incentive contracts as described in this subpart are appropriate when a firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate and the required supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain instances, with improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor's performance. Incentive contracts are designed to obtain specific acquisition objectives by—

(1) Establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly communicated to the contractor; and

(2) Including appropriate incentive arrangements designed to (i) motivate contractor efforts that might not otherwise be emphasized and (ii) discourage contractor inefficiency and waste.

(b) When predetermined, formula-type incentives on technical performance or delivery are included, increases in profit or fee are provided only for achievement that surpasses the targets, and decreases are provided for to the extent that such targets are not met. The incentive increases or decreases are applied to performance targets rather than minimum performance requirements.

(c) The two basic categories of incentive contracts are fixed-price incentive contracts (see 16.403 and 16.404) and cost-reimbursement incentive contracts (see 16.405). Since it is usually to the Government's advantage for the contractor to assume substantial cost responsibility and an appropriate share of the cost risk, fixed-price incentive contracts are preferred when contract costs and performance requirements are reasonably certain. Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts are subject to the overall limitations in 16.301 that apply to all cost-reimbursement contracts.

(d) A determination and finding, signed by the head of the contracting activity, shall be completed for all incentive- and award-fee contracts justifying that the use of this type of contract is in the best interest of the Government. This determination shall be documented in the contract file and, for award-fee contracts, shall address all of the suitability items in 16.401(e)(1).

(e) Award-fee contracts are a type of incentive contract.

(1) Application. An award-fee contract is suitable for use when—

(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, schedule, and technical performance;

(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward exceptional performance and provides the Government with the flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was achieved; and

(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits as documented by a risk and cost benefit analysis to be included in the Determination and Findings referenced in 16.401(e)(5)(iii).

(2) Award-fee amount. The amount of award fee earned shall be commensurate with the contractor's overall cost, schedule, and technical performance as measured against contract requirements in accordance with the criteria stated in the award-fee plan. Award fee shall not be earned if the contractor's overall cost, schedule, and technical performance in the aggregate is below satisfactory. The basis for all award-fee determinations shall be documented in the contract file to include, at a minimum, a determination that overall cost, schedule and technical performance in the aggregate is or is not at a satisfactory level. This determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.

(3) Award-fee plan. All contracts providing for award fees shall be supported by an award-fee plan that establishes the procedures for evaluating award fee and an Award-Fee Board for conducting the award-fee evaluation. Award-fee plans shall—

(i) Be approved by the FDO unless otherwise authorized by agency procedures;

(ii) Identify the award-fee evaluation criteria and how they are linked to acquisition objectives which shall be defined in terms of contract cost, schedule, and technical performance. Criteria should motivate the contractor to enhance performance in the areas rated, but not at the expense of at least minimum acceptable performance in all other areas;

(iii) Describe how the contractor's performance will be measured against the award-fee evaluation criteria;

(iv) Utilize the adjectival rating and associated description as well as the award-fee pool earned percentages shown below in Table 16-1. Contracting officers may supplement the adjectival rating description. The method used to determine the adjectival rating must be documented in the award-fee plan;

Table 16-1

Award-Fee Adjectival Rating

Award-Fee Pool Available To Be Earned

Description

Excellent

91%—100%

Contractor has exceeded almost all of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Very Good

76%—90%

Contractor has exceeded many of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Good

51%—75%

Contractor has exceeded some of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Satisfactory

No Greater Than 50%

Contractor has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

Unsatisfactory

0%

Contractor has failed to meet overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period.

(v) Prohibit earning any award fee when a contractor's overall cost, schedule, and technical performance in the aggregate is below satisfactory;

(vi) Provide for evaluation period(s) to be conducted at stated intervals during the contract period of performance so that the contractor will periodically be informed of the quality of its performance and the areas in which improvement is expected ( e.g. six months, nine months, twelve months, or at specific milestones); and

(vii) Define the total award-fee pool amount and how this amount is allocated across each evaluation period.

(4) Rollover of unearned award fee. The use of rollover of unearned award fee is prohibited.

(5) Limitations. No award-fee contract shall be awarded unless—

(i) All of the limitations in 16.301-3, that are applicable to cost-reimbursement contracts only, are complied with;

(ii) An award-fee plan is completed in accordance with the requirements in 16.401(e)(3); and

(iii) A determination and finding is completed in accordance with 16.401(d) addressing all of the suitability items in 16.401(e)(1).

(f) Incentive- and Award-Fee Data Collection and Analysis. Each agency shall collect relevant data on award fee and incentive fees paid to contractors and include performance measures to evaluate such data on a regular basis to determine effectiveness of award and incentive fees as a tool for improving contractor performance and achieving desired program outcomes. This information should be considered as part of the acquisition planning process (see 7.105) in determining the appropriate type of contract to be utilized for future acquisitions.

(g) Incentive- and Award-Fee Best Practices. Each agency head shall provide mechanisms for sharing proven incentive strategies for the acquisition of different types of products and services among contracting and program management officials.

§ 16.402-1 16.402-1 Cost incentives.

(a) Most incentive contracts include only cost incentives, which take the form of a profit or fee adjustment formula and are intended to motivate the contractor to effectively manage costs. No incentive contract may provide for other incentives without also providing a cost incentive (or constraint).

(b) Except for award-fee contracts (see 16.404 and 16.401 (e)), incentive contracts include a target cost, a target profit or fee, and a profit or fee adjustment formula that (within the constraints of a price ceiling or minimum and maximum fee) provides that—

(1) Actual cost that meets the target will result in the target profit or fee;

(2) Actual cost that exceeds the target will result in downward adjustment of target profit or fee; and

(3) Actual cost that is below the target will result in upward adjustment of target profit or fee.

§ 16.402-2 16.402-2 Performance incentives.

(a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g., a missile range, an aircraft speed, an engine thrust, or a vehicle maneuverability) or other specific elements of the contractor's performance. These incentives should be designed to relate profit or fee to results achieved by the contractor, compared with specified targets.

(b) To the maximum extent practicable, positive and negative performance incentives shall be considered in connection with service contracts for performance of objectively measurable tasks when quality of performance is critical and incentives are likely to motivate the contractor.

(c) Technical performance incentives may be particularly appropriate in major systems contracts, both in development (when performance objectives are known and the fabrication of prototypes for test and evaluation is required) and in production (if improved performance is attainable and highly desirable to the Government).

(d) Technical performance incentives may involve a variety of specific characteristics that contribute to the overall performance of the end item. Accordingly, the incentives on individual technical characteristics must be balanced so that no one of them is exaggerated to the detriment of the overall performance of the end item.

(e) Performance tests and/or assessments of work performance are generally essential in order to determine the degree of attainment of performance targets. Therefore, the contract must be as specific as possible in establishing test criteria (such as testing conditions, instrumentation precision, and data interpretation) and performance standards (such as the quality levels of services to be provided).

(f) Because performance incentives present complex problems in contract administration, the contracting officer should negotiate them in full coordination with Government engineering and pricing specialists.

(g) It is essential that the Government and contractor agree explicitly on the effect that contract changes (e.g., pursuant to the Changes clause) will have on performance incentives.

(h) The contracting officer must exercise care, in establishing performance criteria, to recognize that the contractor should not be rewarded or penalized for attainments of Government-furnished components.

§ 16.402-3 16.402-3 Delivery incentives.

(a) Delivery incentives should be considered when improvement from a required delivery schedule is a significant Government objective. It is important to determine the Government's primary objectives in a given contract (e.g., earliest possible delivery or earliest quantity production).

(b) Incentive arrangements on delivery should specify the application of the reward-penalty structure in the event of Government-caused delays or other delays beyond the control, and without the fault or negligence, of the contractor or subcontractor.

§ 16.402-4 16.402-4 Structuring multiple-incentive contracts.

A properly structured multiple-incentive arrangement should—

(a) Motivate the contractor to strive for outstanding results in all incentive areas; and

(b) Compel trade-off decisions among the incentive areas, consistent with the Government's overall objectives for the acquisition. Because of the interdependency of the Government's cost, the technical performance, and the delivery goals, a contract that emphasizes only one of the goals may jeopardize control over the others. Because outstanding results may not be attainable for each of the incentive areas, all multiple-incentive contracts must include a cost incentive (or constraint) that operates to preclude rewarding a contractor for superior technical performance or delivery results when the cost of those results outweighs their value to the Government.

§ 16.403 16.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts.

(a) Description. A fixed-price incentive contract is a fixed-price contract that provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by application of a formula based on the relationship of total final negotiated cost to total target cost. The final price is subject to a price ceiling, negotiated at the outset. The two forms of fixed-price incentive contracts, firm target and successive targets, are further described in 16.403-1 and 16.403-2 below.

(b) Application. A fixed-price incentive contract is appropriate when—

(1) A firm-fixed-price contract is not suitable;

(2) The nature of the supplies or services being acquired and other circumstances of the acquisition are such that the contractor's assumption of a degree of cost responsibility will provide a positive profit incentive for effective cost control and performance; and

(3) If the contract also includes incentives on technical performance and/or delivery, the performance requirements provide a reasonable opportunity for the incentives to have a meaningful impact on the contractor's management of the work.

(c) Billing prices. In fixed-price incentive contracts, billing prices are established as an interim basis for payment. These billing prices may be adjusted, within the ceiling limits, upon request of either party to the contract, when it becomes apparent that final negotiated cost will be substantially different from the target cost.

§ 16.403-1 16.403-1 Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.

(a) Description. A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract specifies a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula. These elements are all negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses. When the contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the final price is established by applying the formula. When the final cost is less than the target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit greater than the target profit; conversely, when final cost is more than target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit less than the target profit, or even a net loss. If the final negotiated cost exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. Because the profit varies inversely with the cost, this contract type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs.

(b) Application. A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the outset a firm target cost, target profit, and profit adjustment formula that will provide a fair and reasonable incentive and a ceiling that provides for the contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk. When the contractor assumes a considerable or major share of the cost responsibility under the adjustment formula, the target profit should reflect this responsibility.

(c) Limitations. This contract type may be used only when—

(1) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for providing data to support negotiation of final cost and incentive price revision; and

(2) Adequate cost or pricing information for establishing reasonable firm targets is available at the time of initial contract negotiation.

(d) Contract Schedule. The contracting officer shall specify in the contract Schedule the target cost, target profit, and target price for each item subject to incentive price revision.

§ 16.403-2 16.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.

(a) Description. (1) A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract specifies the following elements, all of which are negotiated at the outset:

(i) An initial target cost.

(ii) An initial target profit.

(iii) An initial profit adjustment formula to be used for establishing the firm target profit, including a ceiling and floor for the firm target profit. (This formula normally provides for a lesser degree of contractor cost responsibility than would a formula for establishing final profit and price.)

(iv) The production point at which the firm target cost and firm target profit will be negotiated (usually before delivery or shop completion of the first item).

(v) A ceiling price that is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances.

(2) When the production point specified in the contract is reached, the parties negotiate the firm target cost, giving consideration to cost experience under the contract and other pertinent factors. The firm target profit is established by the formula. At this point, the parties have two alternatives, as follows:

(i) They may negotiate a firm fixed price, using the firm target cost plus the firm target profit as a guide.

(ii) If negotiation of a firm fixed price is inappropriate, they may negotiate a formula for establishing the final price using the firm target cost and firm target profit. The final cost is then negotiated at completion, and the final profit is established by formula, as under the fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract (see 16.403-1 above).

(b) Application. A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract is appropriate when—

(1) Available cost or pricing information is not sufficient to permit the negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit before award;

(2) Sufficient information is available to permit negotiation of initial targets; and

(3) There is reasonable assurance that additional reliable information will be available at an early point in the contract performance so as to permit negotiation of either (i) a firm fixed price or (ii) firm targets and a formula for establishing final profit and price that will provide a fair and reasonable incentive. This additional information is not limited to experience under the contract, itself, but may be drawn from other contracts for the same or similar items.

(c) Limitations. This contract type may be used only when—

(1) The contractor's accounting system is adequate for providing data for negotiating firm targets and a realistic profit adjustment formula, as well as later negotiation of final costs; and

(2) Cost or pricing information adequate for establishing a reasonable firm target cost is reasonably expected to be available at an early point in contract performance.

(d) Contract Schedule. The contracting officer shall specify in the contract Schedule the initial target cost, initial target profit, and initial target price for each item subject to incentive price revision.

§ 16.404 16.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.

Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the Government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot be used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively. Such contracts shall establish a fixed price (including normal profit) for the effort. This price will be paid for satisfactory contract performance. Award fee earned (if any) will be paid in addition to that fixed price. See 16.401(e) for the requirements relative to utilizing this contract type.

§ 16.405 16.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

See 16.301 for requirements applicable to all cost-reimbursement contracts, for use in conjunction with the following subsections.

§ 16.405-1 16.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

(a) Description. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. The formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee above target fee when total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases in fee below target fee when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater than or less than the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the minimum or maximum fee.

(b) Application. (1) A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is appropriate for services or development and test programs when—

(i) A cost-reimbursement contract is necessary (see 16.301-2) and

(ii) A target cost and a fee adjustment formula can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the contractor to manage effectively.

(2) The contract may include technical performance incentives when it is highly probable that the required development of a major system is feasible and the Government has established its performance objectives, at least in general terms. This approach may also apply to other acquisitions, if the use of both cost and technical performance incentives is desirable and administratively practical.

(3) The fee adjustment formula should provide an incentive that will be effective over the full range of reasonably foreseeable variations from target cost. If a high maximum fee is negotiated, the contract shall also provide for a low minimum fee that may be a zero fee or, in rare cases, a negative fee.

(c) Limitations. No cost-plus-incentive-fee contract shall be awarded unless all limitations in 16.301-3 are complied with.

§ 16.405-2 16.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.

A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of the contract, if applicable and at the discretion of the contracting officer, and (2) an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in the areas of cost, schedule, and technical performance. See 16.401(e) for the requirements relative to utilizing this contract type.

§ 16.406 16.406 Contract clauses.

(a) Insert the clause at 52.216-16, Incentive Price Revision—Firm Target, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract is contemplated. If the contract calls for supplies or services to be ordered under a provisioning document or Government option and the prices are to be subject to the incentive price revision under the clause, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I.

(b) Insert the clause at 52.216-17, Incentive Price Revision—Successive Targets, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract is contemplated. If the contract calls for supplies or services to be ordered under a provisioning document or Government option and the prices are to be subject to incentive price revision under the clause, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I.

(c) The clause at 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, is prescribed in 16.307(a) for insertion in solicitations and contracts when a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract or a cost-plus-award-fee contract is contemplated.

(d) The clause at 52.216-10, Incentive Fee, is prescribed in 16.307(d) for insertion in solicitations and contracts when a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is contemplated.

(e) Insert an appropriate award-fee clause in solicitations and contracts when an award-fee contract is contemplated, provided that the clause—

(1) Is prescribed by or approved under agency acquisition regulations;

(2) Is compatible with the clause at 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment; and

(3) Expressly provides that the award amount and the award-fee determination methodology are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.

§ 16.500 16.500 Scope of subpart.

(a) This subpart prescribes policies and procedures for making awards of indefinite-delivery contracts and establishes a preference for making multiple awards of indefinite-quantity contracts.

(b) This subpart does not limit the use of other than competitive procedures authorized by part 6.

(c) Nothing in this subpart restricts the authority of the General Services Administration (GSA) to enter into schedule, multiple award, or task or delivery order contracts under any other provision of law. Therefore, GSA regulations and the coverage for the Federal Supply Schedule program in subpart 8.4 and part 38 take precedence over this subpart.

(d) The statutory multiple award preference implemented by this subpart does not apply to architect-engineer contracts subject to the procedures in subpart 36.6. However, agencies are not precluded from making multiple awards for architect-engineer services using the procedures in this subpart, provided the selection of contractors and placement of orders are consistent with subpart 36.6.

(e) See subpart 19.5 for procedures to set aside part or parts of multiple-award contracts for small businesses; to reserve one or more awards for small business on multiple-award contracts; and to set aside orders for small businesses under multiple-award contracts.

§ 16.501-1 16.501-1 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

Delivery-order contract means a contract for supplies that does not procure or specify a firm quantity of supplies (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) and that provides for the issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract.

Task-order contract means a contract for services that does not procure or specify a firm quantity of services (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) and that provides for the issuance of orders for the performance of tasks during the period of the contract.